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Abstract
Central banks have a long tradition of minimizing their exposure to credit-risk.
The Federal Reserve’s response to the recent financial crisis, which entailed greater
risk-taking, has raised the question of whether such ‘unusual’ practices are desir-
able. This paper addresses the vacuum in the literature with a highly simplified
model that has nevertheless the characteristics missing in the literature: it is a
monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with an inflation-targeting
central bank, aggregate risk, bankruptcy, and it is tractable. The main contribution
is showing that, in an economy with bankruptcy rights and considerably indebted
households, a Central Bank that operates exclusively with risk-free assets effects
important distortions; in particular, it benefits the failure-free industries and pun-
ishes the failure-prone ones. Thus, on average, it takes longer for the economy to
recover and risk-taking behaviour is pro-cyclical. This is even with complete finan-
cial markets, perfect competition, both well-behaved production technologies and
preferences, as well as flexible prices. Other results include conditions under which
the behavior of the Credit-Spread is pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical (despite of a
constant probaility of failure) and proposals of different monetized subsidy schemes
that would avoid the distortions and even the Zero Lower Bound problem.
JEL: E02, E13, E42, E43, E44, E51, E52, E58, G12, G13.
Keywords: Central Bank, Monetary Policy, Default, Bankruptcy, Cash-in-Advance
Models, Inflation Targeting, Credit Spreads, Zero Lower Bound.
1 Introduction
Should central banks take on credit risk? Up until the last financial crisis, they surely
didn’t; and some still don’t. But the financial crisis changed the landscape, and some big
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central banks (like the Fed and the ECB) employed different “unconventional” policies,
most of which involved greater risk-taking in one way or another.1 Surprisingly though,
there is little–if any–theory for answering the question of whether central banks should
take on credit-risk (a question already posed by Cecchetti, back in 2009).
This paper aims to provide a starting point for answering such a complex question. It
does so with a simple model and some greatly simplifying assumptions on the bankruptcy
procedure. In spite of this, the paper yields a far more plausible framework than models
that ignore bankruptcy altogether (as has usually been done), and shows that aggregate
risk and bankruptcy procedures require central banks to modify their more traditional
practices.
To be more specific, the model has four agents: The representative household, the
representative risky firm, the representative safe firm, and an inflation-targeting central
bank. The risky-industry (i.e., the representative risky firm) has a constant probability of
failure. Prices are flexible and there is only one perishable good. There is no physical cap-
ital and the time horizon is infinite. Every period, households purchase the consumption
good, work at the firms, transact financial assets, and receive both wages and dividends.
Wages and dividends are paid out after the markets close though.
The inclusion of a risky industry and an inflation-targeting central bank sets this
model apart from other cash-in-advance models. But what really separates this model
from all the rest in the literature is the inclusion of bankruptcy rights without the loss of
tractability.
Collateral and other credit market ‘imperfections’ haven’t permeated the macro liter-
ature, probably because we see most big financing of firms and governments happening
through unsecured loans or issuance of unsecured bonds. This paper shows how, in equi-
librium, bankruptcy rights / limited liability of agents imply a set of restrictions that are
very similar to those of imperfect (collateral-requiring) financial markets.
In the real world, bankruptcy laws are complex and typically have different approaches
to different types of agents. Grossly speaking though, both consumers and firms have two
similar choices when filing for bankruptcy: propose a credible plan to clean up their act
and restructure their debts, or proceed with the liquidation of their assets to pay out
the creditors and be discharged of any remaining debts. In the case of consumers, there
is a certain amount of wealth that is exempt of liquidation and they can “start afresh”
(although a public record of the bankruptcy remains for a couple of years). In the case of
firms, there is no amount exempt from liquidation, they stop operations and go completely
1In fact, at the time of writing, the ECB announced a purchase program of sovereign bonds from
euro area countries; which points to the timeliness and relevance of the opening question. See European
Central Bank (2015).
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out of business.2
In this paper’s model, filing for bankruptcy will directly mean liquidation, for both
households and firms. But bankruptcy declaration and liquidation of assets don’t have
any further consequence for households (no public record is kept), so they can start afresh
immediately and borrow cash for that same period’s consumption. For firms, there are no
fixed, sunk, or startup costs, and as soon as they go out of business they are immediately
replaced by new identical ones in a mechanical fashion. This is, in a nutshell, the simplified
bankruptcy framework employed by the paper.
Financial markets are complete and there is a publicly-known time-invariant ordering
of agents. Risk-free assets are paid out first; and within each asset class, assets are paid
out according to the ordering of agents.3
The first result is that, in the absence of bankruptcy rights, there exists a traditional
monetary policy (one that involves open market operations exclusively with risk-free as-
sets) that achieves an optimal monetary equilibrium–one where the allocation of real
resources is optimal, thus obviating the need for taking on credit-risk; furthermore, it is
shown that this optimal monetary equilibrium implies a pro-cyclical credit-spread. On the
other hand, the second result is that–in the presence of the simplified bankruptcy frame-
work–a traditional monetary policy that achieves the inflation target will—in general—
distort the economy. In fact, a third result shows that in an economy with bankruptcy
rights and significantly indebted households, a traditional policy effects a counter-cyclical
bias on the credit-spread, causing a slowdown of the recovery of output in recessions and
greater risk-taking in expansions. Finally, it is shown that–under certain conditions–the
credit-spread is entirely counter-cyclical for this last case. These results are summarized
in the following table.
Equilibria with Traditional Monetary Policy
Without Bankruptcy With Bankruptcy
Inflation Target is Perfectly Enforced Perfectly Enforced
Allocation of (Real) Resources is Optimal Suboptimal
Credit-Spread is Pro-Cyclical Possibly Counter-Cyclical
2This description is based on the U.S. bankruptcy legislation.
3This priority rule is like Fama and Miller’s “me-first” rule, except for (1) the priority of risk-free over
risky assets and (2) the ordering of agents’ loans being exogenous. This is done for simplicity. See Fama
and Miller (1972, p.152).
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The paper is related to different strands of literature. One strand of literature is that on
the counter-cyclicality of credit-spreads. Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) is an example of
this empirical literature that has widely documented the aforesaid phenomenon; a phe-
nomenon that is consistent with this model’s conclusions on traditional monetary policy.
Another strand of related literature is the one on consumer bankruptcy. Chatterjee and
Gordon (2012) would be an example of this literature which is not involved with monetary
policy. A third strand of related literature is that of Taylor-rules that take credit-spreads
into account. Cu´rdia, V., and M. Woodford (2010) is an example of this literature, which
is concerned with the management of traditional monetary policy when taking an addi-
tional piece of information into account. There is another strand of literature concerned
with the so-called credit multiplier. Olivella and Roldan-Pen˜a (2013) is an example of
this literature, which deals with collateralized loans, and typically omits money. Finally,
there is the literature on financial stability/fragility. This literature is likewise concerned
with bankruptcy (or the closely related ‘default’), but it focuses on regulation of financial
intermediaries rather than on monetary policy. An example of this would be Goodhart,
C., Sunirand, P., and D. Tsomocos (2006).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model and some general
definitions. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium with traditional monetary policy in the
absense of bankruptcy rights. Section 4 introduces bankruptcy rights through the afore-
mentioned simplified bankruptcy framwork ; it then shows that the rational expectations
equilibrium for the economy with bankruptcy rights can be defined by adding a few new
stochastic constraints to the (previous) equilibrium definition for the economy without
bankruptcy rights. Having done so, the section proceeds to characterize the suboptimality
of the equilibrium with traditional monetary policy in the presence of bankruptcy rights
in a couple of important results. Section 5 touches upon a critical semantics issue that
separates exogenous from endogenous bankruptcy in Rational Expectations Equilibria
and suggests a new practice in economic modeling. Section 6 provides a few options of
how to implement the optimal monetary policy in the presence of bankruptcy rights. Sec-
tion 7 mentions how the Zero Lower Bound problem vanishes under one of the proposed
options, and reflects on what the paper’s model has to say on Credit-Spreads. Section 8
concludes.
2 Baseline Model
The monetary DSGE model of the paper is (purposely) built upon a very simple real econ-
omy (hereafter ‘the underlying real-economy’) whose equilibrium is unique and optimal in
a Pareto sense. This unique, optimal equilibrium is used as a benchmark throughout the
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paper. The corresponding (unique and optimal) allocation is used as a measuring rod for
optimality: monetary equilibria are considered optimal–or suboptimal–if their allocation
(of real resources) is the same as–or different from–that of the benchmark.
Comparisons of relative prices in the monetary economy against relative prices in the
underlying real-economy are also useful for characterizing the price-distortions or absence
thereof. After all, in a flexible price economy money is supposed to be just a veil.
The need for money is exclusively justified by a standard cash-in-advance constraint,
so preferences and production possibilities are unaffected. As a result, the use of the
‘underlying real-economy’ as a benchmark is not only warranted but also called for.
Both the underlying real-economy and the different measures of credit-risk are covered
in the appendices A and B in greater detail.
Let us get started with the description of the model. Firms are non-financial,
meaning that they do not make loans, and are not allowed to borrow but for paying wages.
Extraordinary gains or losses are passed on to shareholders in the form of (potentially
negative) dividends. This means shareholders have to “chip in” if the firm is not able to
meet its debt payments. Throughout the whole paper, the same production technology
and preferences are kept. Information is symmetric, but size is not. All but the central
bank are small agents and have therefore no market power. The central bank has market
power, but its objective is price-stability (i.e., not profit maximization); it can therefore
take all but the consumption-good price as given for making its choices (without further
consequence), thus simplifying the analysis.4
There are many economy-wide state-variables: the technological state (or total factor
productivity), A, which follows a deterministic path; the “luck” state, Υ, which is an i.i.d.
random variable taking the value one with probability υ ∈ (0, 1) and zero otherwise; the
aggregate amount of money at the beginning of the period, M , which depends on previous
balances and monetary policy; the previous price level, P, which is the price level that
cleared last period’s market for the consumption good; the output of the representative
safe firm, Y SF, which is predetermined; the output of the representative risky firm con-
ditional on a “lucky” state, Y RF, which is also predetermined; last period’s purchase of
safe assets by the representative safe firm, BSFs , whose return in cash will be paid out this
period; last period’s purchase of “up” assets by the representative safe firm, BSFu , whose
return in cash will be paid out this period if the state is a “lucky” one; last period’s
purchase of safe assets by the representative risky firm, BRFs , whose return in cash will be
paid out this period; last period’s purchase of “up” assets by the representative risky firm,
4It could also take into account its market-power/effect on other prices, but it would be a useless
exercise resulting in the same decision-rule.
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BRFu , whose return in cash will be paid out this period if the state is a “lucky” one; and
last period’s purchase of safe assets by the central bank, BCBs , whose return in cash will be
paid out this period. All but the central bank’s “B”s take negative values in equilibrium
since–by assumption–firms sell (not buy) financial assets. As for the central bank, the
sign of BCBs is–in general–ambiguous.
All economy-wide state-variables are found in the vector S. That is,
S = (A,Υ,M,P, Y SF, Y RF, BSFs , B
SF
u , B
RF
s , B
RF
u , B
CB
s ) .
Before we begin describing each agent, we need to introduce the concept–and notation–
of ‘preceding state’.
Definition. S 8 or ‘S backprime’ is said to be a preceding state, or predecessor, of S if and
only if Pr(S | S 8) > 0.
Notice that if the state contains some variables that are endogenous to the system,
then the concept of preceding state will be, in general, equilibrium-dependent.
2.1 Household
At the beginning of each period, households have some cash-holdings m and some net-
of-cash financial wealth w (which are financial claims to be redeemed in the current
period). Like all agents in the economy, households know the economy-wide state S at
the beginning of the period as well. They choose their current consumption c, their future
cash-holdings m′, their purchased amount of safe bonds bHs
′
, and their purchased amount
of risky bonds bHu
′
to maximize their total utility.5 The given price for the consumption
good is P(S); the given price for the safe bond is Is(S); the given price for the risky
bond is Iu(S); the given price for labor services is W(S); and the given value of received
dividends is D(S).
The value function is
V H(m,w, S) = max
c,m′,bHs
′,bHu
′
{
u(c) + β E
[
V H(m′, w′, S ′)
]}
(1)
subject to
P(S)c+ Is(S)bHs ′ + Iu(S)bHu ′ ≤ m+ w (2)
m′ + P(S)c+ Is(S)bHs ′ + Iu(S)bHu ′ ≤ m+ w +W(S) +D(S) (3)
0 ≤ m′, c (4)
5Recall that risky bonds pay only if the realization of the Bernoulli random variable Υ′ equals one;
and also notice that these two bonds are enough for having complete markets.
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where
w′ ≡ bHs ′ + Υ′bHu ′ (5)
D(S) ≡ (P(S)Y SF +BSFs + ΥBSFu )+ (P(S)ΥY RF +BRFs + ΥBRFu ) (6)
The instant utility function u(·) is increasing and of the CRRA class, with a positive
relative-risk-aversion coefficient.6 Qualitatively analogous results can be obtained for
more general utility functions.
The first restriction (the liquidity constraint) requires housholds to hold liquid wealth
in advance to pay for consumption and asset purchases. In a sense, net-of-cash wealth
w can be seen as inside money. The second restriction is the usual one, and the third
restriction is just for the non-negativity of consumption and cash holdings.
The definition of future net-of-cash financial wealth w′ is straightforward. Dividends
D(S) are defined as the sum of dividends from the safe industry and dividends from the
risky industry; each of them being simply the profit of the corresponding industry, given
the state S and the price P(S).
Recall that for the purpose of this paper, filing for bankruptcy can only mean liq-
uidation, for both household and firms. So a household will file for bankruptcy at the
beginning of the period whenever his wealth in case of paying is less than the exempted
amount whenever he declares bankrupt, that is whenever
m+ w < e(S 8)
where e(S 8) is the exempted amount as a function of the preceding state. Of course, in
the absence of bankruptcy rights this whole paragraph is vacuous.
2.2 Safe Firm
It is assumed that firms (including risky ones) maximize the present value of their whole
profits-stream, given the prices of the complete set of assets. The main result of the paper
(the theorem in section 4) prevails exactly if we have households own firms (in fact, a
latter assumption is not even required if we do so).7 Still, we have chosen the present
approach for the sake of exposition and simplicity.8
6The utility function u(·) is of the CRRA class if and only if uc(x) ≡ du(x)dx = α1x−α2 , with α1 and
α2 real numbers. The number α2 is the (constant) relative risk aversion coefficient, which is defined as
−ucc(x)xuc(x) . The paper assumes α1, α2 > 0.
7This assumption is that, when indifferent, firms prefer to finance themselves by issuing safe, rather
than risky, debt.
8To be clear, this section’s results would not be exactly the same because of liquidity premia; but
taking this other path would only distract us from the–far more pressing–topic of this paper.
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The paper employs the easier decision-problem of maximizing the value of next period’s
profits, instead of maximizing the value of the whole stream of profits. Both approaches
are equivalent for the present paper.9 At the beginning of the period, the safe firm knows
the economy-wide state S. It chooses how much labor lSF to hire and how to finance this
through the purchase10 of safe bonds bSFs
′
and risky bonds bSFu
′
. M(S ′, S) is the monetary
stochastic discount factor and ΨSF(lSF, bSFs
′
, bSFu
′
, S ′, S) is next period’s profit for the safe
firm (which depends on next period’s state S ′); they are both defined below.
The value function for the safe firm is therefore
V SF(S) = max
lSF,bSFs
′,bSFu
′
{
E
[
M(S ′, S)ΨSF(lSF, bSFs ′, bSFu ′, S ′, S)
]}
(7)
subject to
W(S)lSF + Is(S)bSFs ′ + Iu(S)bSFu ′ = 0 (8)
bSFs
′
, bSFu
′ ≥ 0 (9)
where
ΨSF(lSF, bSFs
′
, bSFu
′
, S ′, S) ≡ P(S ′)Af(lSF) + bSFs ′ + Υ′bSFu ′ (10)
M(S ′, S) ≡ Υ′Iu(S)
υ
+ (1−Υ′) (Is(S)− Iu(S))
1− υ (11)
The function f(·) employed for both the risky and the safe firm is twice continuously
differentiable with f(0) = 0, fl(·) > 0 > fll(·), limx→0+ fl(x) = ∞, and a Relative Risk
Aversion coefficient −fll(x)x
fl(x)
smaller than 1−α2x [γfl(x)−fl(1−x)][γf(x)+f(1−x)] . This last requirement is a
sufficient condition to guarantee uniqueness for some final results of the paper.
Recall that for the purpose of this paper, filing for bankruptcy can only mean liq-
uidation, for both household and firms. So firms will do so if they have losses. Now,
bankruptcy must be declared at the very beginning of each period, so a representative
safe firm will file for bankruptcy at the beginning of the period if
P(S)Y SF +BSFs + ΥBSFu < 0
In the absence of bankruptcy rights this last paragraph is vacuous.
9Basically, today’s choices don’t affect the future decision problem because shareholders are assumed
to to take profits or pay residual claims such that the firm begins next period with a clean slate.
10The firm will actually sell bonds (borrow), and the sign of this variables will be non-positive; but we
have modeled all bond transactions of agents as purchases for notational ease.
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2.3 Risky Firm
At the beginning of the period, the risky firm knows the economy-wide state S. It chooses
how much labor lRF to hire and how to finance this through the purchase11 of safe bonds
bRFs
′
and risky bonds bRFu
′
. M(S ′, S) is the monetary stochastic discount factor and
ΨRF(lRF, bRFs
′
, bRFu
′
, S ′, S) is next period’s profit for the risky firm (which depends on next
period’s state S ′); they are both defined below.
The value function is
V RF(S) = max
lRF,bRFs
′,bRFu
′
{
E
[
M(S ′, S)ΨRF(lRF, bRFs ′, bRFu ′, S ′, S)
]}
(12)
subject to
W(S)lRF + Is(S)bRFs ′ + Iu(S)bRFu ′ = 0 (13)
bRFs
′
, bRFu
′ ≥ 0 (14)
where
ΨRF(lRF, bRFs
′
, bRFu
′
, S ′, S) ≡ P(S ′)Υ′γAf(lRF) + bRFs ′ + Υ′bRFu ′ (15)
M(S ′, S) ≡ Υ′Iu(S)
υ
+ (1−Υ′) (Is(S)− Iu(S))
1− υ (16)
Recall that for the purpose of this paper, filing for bankruptcy can only mean liq-
uidation, for both household and firms. So firms will do so if they have losses. Now,
bankruptcy must be declared at the very beginning of each period, so a representative
risky firm will file for bankruptcy at the beginning of the period if
P(S)ΥY RF +BRFs + ΥBRFu < 0
Again, in the absence of bankruptcy rights this last paragraph is vacuous.
2.4 Inflation-Targeting Central Bank
It is assumed that the central bank cares only about currently reaching the inflation target
piT or, equivalently, having current prices P equal past prices times one plus the inflation
target P(1 + piT). Since we are limiting ourselves to traditional monetary policy, the only
instrument of the central bank is the purchase/sale of risk-free bonds bCBs
′
. The central
11The firm will actually sell bonds (borrow), and the sign of this variables will be non-positive; but we
have modeled all bond transactions of agents as purchases for notational ease.
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bank’s value function is parameterized for simplicity with an indicator function I(·). So
it will reach the value 1 if the inflation target is perfectly enforced for the current period
(pi = piT) and 0 if not (pi 6= piT):
V CB(S) = max
bCBs
′
{
I
(
P(bCBs ′, S) = (1 + piT)P
)}
(17)
where
P(bCBs ′, S) =
M −Υ(BSFu +BRFu )− (BSFs +BRFs )−BCBs −W(S) + Is(S)bCBs ′
Y SF + ΥY RF
(18)
The last function is derived ‘by the central bank’ assuming the household’s liquidity con-
straint is binding and markets clear (conditions that will be covered in the next section).12
The reader will find the detailed derivation in the appendix. Recall that, because it only
cares about currently reaching its inflation-target, it doesn’t matter if the central bank
takes wages and interest rates as given. This greatly simplifies the analysis though.13
2.5 Credit-Risk and Cyclicality
We now introduce two measures of credit-risk that will be widely used in our
results.
Definition. The ‘nominal risk-ratio’, denoted by IsIu , is the ratio between the safe bond’s
price and the risky bond’s price.
The nominal risk-ratio, although never used in the financial world, is the most impor-
tant of both measures from an economic point of view: it is a relative price that should be
equal to the corresponding relative price of the ‘underlying real-economy’. All the bonds
in the main text are one-period bonds. So the interest rate ij of the bond j with price Ij
is simply given by the relation Ij = 11+ij for j = u, s.
Definition. The ‘nominal risk-spread’, denoted by ξ, is the difference between the nominal
interest rate of the risky bond and the nominal interest rate of the safe bond:
ξ ≡ iu − is .
12It can be shown that, in this paper’s model, a money-growth target is weakly dominated by a price-
growth target in terms of welfare. We only mention this in passing, since it is a topic outside of the
paper’s scope.
13Notice that, from this last equation (multiplying it by Y you get PY = M − other terms, but by
definition PY ≡MV so V = 1− other terms/M), the velocity of money is not constant. This is because
−Υ(BSFu +BRFu )− (BSFs +BRFs )−BCBs −W(S) + Is(S)bCBs ′ would have to be the same for both values of
Υ (one of the variables included in the state-vector S).
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The nominal risk-spread is the widestly used measure of Credit-Risk. And the paper
has results with regards to it as well.
Since most of the results are intimately related to the cyclicality of certain
variables, we shall introduce a formal definition now. Naturally, we will use the growth
factor of output, or Y (S
′)
Y (S)
, for this.
Definition. A variable X(S) is said to be pro-cyclical if and only if its conditional-on-
the-preceding-state correlation with Y (S
′)
Y (S)
is positive, for every preceding state S 8:
corr
(
X(S),
Y (S ′)
Y (S)
∣∣∣∣S 8) > 0 ∀S 8
For the sequential case, a stochastic process {Xt}∞t=0 is said to be pro-cyclical if and only
if corr
(
Xt,
Yt+1
Yt
)
> 0 for all t, given the stochastic process {Yt+1
Yt
}∞t=0. A counter-cyclical
variable is defined by using the opposite strict-inequality signs, and an acyclical variable
is defined by using equality signs.
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Let us briefly touch upon the evolution of S.
The economy’s state S = (A,Υ,M,P, Y SF, Y RF, BSFs , B
SF
u , B
RF
s , B
RF
u , B
CB
s ) evolves ac-
cording to the following laws of motion
A′ = hA(A), for some suitable function hA(·) ; (19)
Υ′ =
{
1 with invariant probability υ,
0 otherwise;
(20)
M ′ =
∫
m′(S); (21)
P′ = P(S) ; (22)
Y SF
′
=
∫
Af(lSF(S)) ; (23)
Y RF
′
=
∫
γAf(lRF(S)) ; (24)
BSFs
′
=
∫
bSFs
′
(S) ; (25)
BSFu
′
=
∫
bSFu
′
(S) ; (26)
BRFs
′
=
∫
bRFs
′
(S) ; (27)
BRFu
′
=
∫
bRFu
′
(S) ; and (28)
BCBs
′
= bCBs
′
(S) . (29)
An integral sign
∫
has been set to emphasize the aggregation of the small agents/the
representative character of all but the Central Bank. It is timely to remark that M ′ =
M − BCBs + Is(S)bCBs ′ in any equilibrium. That is, tomorrow’s cash equals today’s cash
after today’s central-bank operations.
Remark 2.1. Issues of nominal indeterminacy are out of this paper’s scope. The paper’s
interest lies in the credit-risk distortions caused by the central bank’s implementation of
monetary policy. Therefore, we will focus on equilibria where all nominal risk-free inter-
est rates are positive (as in Lucas (1982)), and write “equilibria with positive rates” for
short.14
14There are many assumptions (or relaxations thereof) that ensure determinacy. ‘Positive rates’ is a
sufficient, but not necessary, condition. We avoid making these assumptions or relaxations thereof, for
the sake of simplicity.
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3 Equilibrium with unlimited liability (absence of bank-
ruptcy rights)
Definition. An equilibrium without bankruptcy rights consists of decision rules,
c(S),m′(S), bHs
′
(S), bHu
′
(S) for the representative household, lSF(S), bSFs
′
(S), bSFu
′
(S) for the
representative safe firm, lRF(S), bRFs
′
(S), bRFu
′
(S) for the representative risky firm,
bCBs
′
(S) for the central bank, and a state-dependent price-vector 〈P(S), Is(S), Iu(S),W(S)〉
such that:
1. the decision rules for the household are a solution to problem (1), given the price-
vector 〈P(S), Is(S), Iu(S),W(S)〉 and the laws of motion;
2. the decision rules for the safe firm are a solution to problem (7), given the price-
vector 〈P(S), Is(S), Iu(S),W(S)〉 and the laws of motion;
3. the decision rules for the risky firm are a solution to problem (12), given the price-
vector 〈P(S), Is(S), Iu(S),W(S)〉 and the laws of motion;
4. the decision rule for the central bank is a solution to problem (17), given the price-
vector 〈Is(S), Iu(S),W(S)〉 and the laws of motion; and
5. all markets clear: ∫
c(S) = Y SF + ΥY RF ≡ Y ∀S; (30)∫
lSF(S) +
∫
lRF(S) = 1 ∀S; (31)
bCBs
′
(S) +
∫
bHs
′
(S) +
∫
bSFs
′
(S) +
∫
bRFs
′
(S) = 0 ∀S; (32)∫
bHu
′
(S) +
∫
bSFu
′
(S) +
∫
bRFu
′
(S) = 0 ∀S. (33)
Proposition 1. In the absence of bankruptcy rights, every equilibrium with positive rates:
• is optimal (i.e., the allocation of real resources is the same as that of the underlying
real economy);
• has a perfectly enforced inflation target (i.e., P(S ′) = (1 + piT)P (S) for all S ′ given
S, for all S);
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• has the same price-vector 〈P(S), Is(S), Iu(S),W(S)〉 (i.e., there is price-vector de-
terminacy);
• has a constant nominal risk-ratio IsIu .
In other words, money is (super) neutral under the “traditional implementation”
of monetary policy by an inflation-targeting central bank.15 Importantly, this neutral-
ity/freedom from distortions will not be the case when we move on to economies with
bankruptcy rights.
An important, and perhaps surprising, feature of these monetary equilibria is the pro-
cyclicality of the nominal risk-spread (a.k.a. credit-spread). We touch upon this feature
now.
Claim 1. Every equilibrium from Proposition 1 has a pro-cyclical nominal risk-spread.
The logic behind the result is as follows. First of all, the nominal risk-spread iu − is
satisfies iu − is = ( IsIu − 1)(1 + is) whenever an inflation target is perfectly enforced.16
Second, the previous proposition stated that every equilibria has a constant nominal
risk-ratio IsIu . Thus the only variation in the nominal risk-spread comes from the variation
in the nominal risk-free rate is. In fact, since inflation is constant at equilibrium, the only
source of variation is the risk-free real interest rate. And, as in typical consumption-based
asset-pricing models, the risk-free rate is positively correlated with expected consumption
growth (which in this model equals expected output growth).
4 Equilibrium with limited liability (presence of bank-
ruptcy rights)
In the real world, as previously said, typically both consumers and firms have the
following two choices when filing for bankruptcy: propose a credible plan to clean up
their act and restructure their debts, or proceed with the liquidation of their assets to pay
out the creditors and be discharged of any remaining debts. In the case of consumers,
there is a certain amount that is exempt from liquidation and they can “start afresh”
(although a public record of the bankruptcy event remains for a couple of years). In the
case of firms, there is no amount exempt from liquidation, they stop operations and go
completely out of business.
15In the sense that not only the level but also the growth rate of the price level is innocuous for the
allocation of (real) resources.
16See Appendix B.2 .
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In this paper’s model, on the other hand, we assume a simplified bankruptcy frame-
work where: (1) filing for bankruptcy necessarily entails liquidation, for both households
and firms, although households still have the right to an exempted amount; (2) bankruptcy
filing and liquidation of assets don’t have any further consequence for households (no pub-
lic record is kept), so they can start afresh immediately and borrow cash for that same
period’s consumption; and (3) firms have no fixed, sunk, or startup costs, and as soon
as they go out of business they are immediately replaced by new identical ones in a
mechanical fashion.
It is assumed that there is a publicly-known time-invariant ordering of agents, and
that redemption of bonds follows two rules: (1) Risk-free assets are paid out first; and (2)
within each asset class, assets are paid out according to the ordering of agents.17
Now, recall that:
• The representative safe firm will file for bankruptcy at the beginning of the period
if
P(S)Y SF +BSFs + ΥBSFu < 0
• The representative risky firm will file for bankruptcy at the beginning of the period
if
P(S)ΥY RF +BRFs + ΥBRFu < 0
• And the representative household will file for bankruptcy at the beginning of the
period if
m+ w < e(S 8)
If any of these three bankruptcy cases occur (safe firm, risky firm, or household),
it means that at least one agent in the economy is not being repaid according to the
return-vector.18 Hence, at least one agent is not rational and this cannot be a Rational
Expectations Equilibrium.19 Indeed, these are out-of-equilibrium bankruptcies. We will
talk about in-equilibrium bankruptcies in the next section.
17As previously noted, this priority rule is like Fama and Miller’s “me-first” rule except for (1) the
priority of risk-free over risky assets and (2) the ordering of agents’ loans being exogenous. This last
assumption is done for simplicity.
18Formally, it should read “a positive measure of agents is not being repaid. . . ”
19Remember, in a Rational Expectations Equilibrium everyone knows the model and–hence–everyone
else’s strategies. Since assets are paid out according to a public ordering of agents, every agent knows in
advance whether he will be on the “short list” or not.
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4.1 Immediate Implications of Bankruptcy Rights for the Ra-
tional Expectations Equilibrium (REE)
Recall our assumptions that (1) there is a publicly-known time-invariant ordering of
agents; (2) Risk-free assets are paid out first; and (3) within each asset class, assets
are paid out according to the ordering of agents. A rational expectations equilibrium
cannot have agents lending at the same rate as everyone else, if they know they are not
getting paid according to the return-vector of the asset (like everyone else is).
It can be shown that this implies a new set of restrictions for a rational expectations
equilibrium. Namely:
m′ + bHs
′
+ Υ′bHu
′ ≥ e(S) a.s. (34)
P(S ′)Af(lSF) + bSFs ′ + Υ′bSFu ′ ≥ 0 a.s. (35)
P(S ′)Υ′γAf(lRF) + bRFs ′ + Υ′bRFu ′ ≥ 0 a.s. (36)
where ‘a.s.’ stands for ‘almost surely’ (i.e., with probability one).
Thus, despite the completeness and perfection of financial markets, bankruptcy con-
siderations imply that agents are ‘endogenously constrained’ in their borrowings. This is
because in a rational equilibrium no one will lend an amount beyond the “repayment-is-
optimal boundary.” Borrowing constraints are by no means new, but this model’s con-
straints are considerably different from the typical constraints. First, typical constraints
are exogenously set; here, on the other hand, agents are in principle unconstrained in
their choice problems but it is in equilibrium that these constraints have to be satisfied.
In other words, it is not that firms and/or households cannot borrow any further,20 it’s
that the households and/or the central bank would not be rational in lending them any
further because they wouldn’t be repaid as promised.21 This equilibrium-quality of the
constraints does not require a completely different mathematical method of solution, but
it does make an important difference on the understanding, policy implications, and in-
terpretation of the economy. Second, typical borrowing constraints depend on the value
of the agent’s collateral at the time of borrowing; here, on the other hand, loans are unse-
cured but courts force debtors to pay with any available means, so the constraints depend
on the future value of the borrower’s means. Third, typical borrowing constraints depend
exclusively on deterministic variables; here, on the other hand, constraints depend on the
distribution of random variables as well.
20In fact, one could set all the constraints into the household’s and central bank’s choice problems,
and leave the firms’ problems intact. This is because, if counterparties are unwilling to lend, the effect
is–in equilibrium–that of a borrowing constraint.
21To be precise, a positive measure of them wouldn’t be repaid at all.
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4.2 The Suboptimality of Traditional Policy in the presence of
Bankruptcy Rights
We add the three new REE stochastic restrictions (equations 34–36) to the equilibrium
definition and assume that firms finance themselves exclusively with safe debt if they are
indifferent between issuing safe or risky debt (this assumption is not necessary if house-
holds control firms, which would be the formal way to proceed, but the exposition would
be more cumbersome). The following lemma sets the stage for our main result.
Lemma 1. In the model with bankruptcy, equilibria with positive rates
1. are–in general–suboptimal, and
2. have a perfectly enforced inflation target (i.e., P(S ′) = (1+piT)P (S) for all S ′ given
S, for all S).
Grossly speaking, the central bank has to flood/drain the economy with/of money
when there are expected contractions/expansions in order to achieve its inflation target.
That would not matter if it wasn’t for the bankruptcy restrictions, which limit the way
some agents can borrow/lend.
The proof of the lemma employs the fact that one of the REE stochastic restrictions
can be simplified into the non-stochastic restriction
m′ + bHs
′ ≥ e(S) (37)
and that another REE stochastic restriction can be simplified into the non-stochastic
restriction
bRFs
′
= 0 . (38)
For some primitives of the model, there are states where households sell risk-free debt
until they cannot credibly borrow anymore (at which point restriction (37) starts to
bind). From that point onwards, further liquidity distorts the economy because households
cannot entirely compensate the increase in the credit-spread by purchasing risky debt and
selling risk-free debt (and risky firms can only finance themselves through risky debt due
to restriction (38)); yet further liquidity is required to achieve the inflation target. This
results in a higher-than-optimal amount of labor at the safe industry, thus lowering the
expected output-growth.
The result on the perfect enforcement of the inflation target is extensively used in the
upcoming theorem; we state the following definition and assumption before.
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Definition. An equilibrium is said to have significantly indebted households if
m′(S) + bHs
′
(S) ≤ e(S)
for all S.
In other words, households are significantly indebted if they are willing to file for
bankruptcy (or indifferent about doing so) in the unlucky states. Notice that the amount
of the household’s risky debt is irrelevant for this definition.
Assumption. Let the exempted amount e(S) be equal or less–but arbitrarily close–to
the nominal income N (S), which is the sum of wage-income and dividends: N (S) ≡
W(S) +D(S).
This assumption is not necessary for the results, but it is sufficient to prove them with
ease.
Theorem. In the presence of bankruptcy rights, equilibria with positive rates and signif-
icantly indebted households
1. have a counter-cyclical nominal risk-ratio IsIu ,
2. have a counter-cyclical amount of real resources allocated to the safe industry; indeed
implying that the economy takes more risk in expansions than in recessions and has
slower recoveries on average.
In short, if the equilibrium has significantly indebted households, then constraint (37)
is always satisfied with equality (and–in general–binding). Naturally, the distortion is
bigger during expected contractions (since the bankruptcy constraint is more binding in
such cases): both the nominal risk-ratio IsIu and the amount of labor at the safe industry
are greater there. Hence their counter-cyclicality.
Following the previous line of thought, if the nominal risk-ratio IsIu varies even more
than the risk-free rate, then the nominal risk spread will become entirely countercyclical.22
The following claim provides a sufficient–though by no means necessary–condition for this
to be true.
Claim 2 (Theorem extension on counter-cyclical Credit-Spreads). For each set of prim-
itives, there is a real number α > 0 such that: if the Constant Relative Risk Aversion
coefficient is α2 < α, then the equilibrium nominal risk-spread (a.k.a. credit-spread) is
counter-cyclical as well.
22Recall that the nominal risk-spread iu − is satisfies iu − is = ( IsIu − 1)(1 + is) whenever an inflation
target is perfectly enforced.
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In fact, like most of the sufficient conditions of this paper, this previous condition is
far from necessary; it is quite possible that counter-cyclicality of the credit-spread holds
for a much wider range of parameters.
In the next section, we will touch upon an important semantics question regarding
bankruptcy in the presence of rational expectations.
5 De-Facto vs De-Jure Returns: the Semantics of
Default under Rational Expectations
As awful as this section’s title is, it is an incredibly important section that readers are
urged to pay attention to.
Suppose we now assumed that the risky firm can only issue debt that is to be repayed
in all the states of the world, and label it after the issuer (i.e. the risky firm). Let us
employ the subindex RF that we have used so far for this purpose. We would then have
that the risky firm can only finance itself as follows:
W(S)lRF + IRF(S)bRFRF′ = 0
where IRF(S) is the equilibrium price that agents would pay for the risky firm’s ‘de jure
safe’ debt.
Now, because this new kind of debt issued by the risky firm is ‘de jure safe’, the
risky firm must take that new repayment schedule (i.e., return vector) into account when
computing its (state-dependent) profits:
ΨRF(lRF, bRFRF
′
, S ′, S) ≡ P(S ′)Υ′γAf(lRF) + bRFRF′
So the risky firm is selling debt that, bankruptcy considerations aside, it would be committed
to pay in both states of the world. Of course, given the bankruptcy laws of the economy,
the shareholders would rather have the risky firm declare itself bankrupt and close for
business than bail it out. Under rational expectations, then, the fact that this new debt is
‘de jure safe’ is immaterial: if it walks like a dog and talks like a dog, then it’s just another
dog no matter what its owner calls it. And notice that it was not only a relabeling that
went on: the contract itself was indeed not state-contingent anymore. What makes this
new ‘de jure safe’ debt a ‘de facto risky’ debt is that shareholders have limited liability and
in the bad state the risky firm will therefore default and go bankrupt. The interpretation
of the economy changes considerably: now the risky firm does default, does go bankrupt,
and does go out of business. So this economy does have bankruptcy in equilibrium! It goes
without saying that this modification addresses the valuable observation by Goodhart and
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Tsomocos (2009) that “Standard DSGE models do not include the possibility of default”.
Moreover, it addresses this issue without the hassles of intractability found in other models
of endogenous default.
We see that the nomenclature of rational-expectations bankruptcy can be confusing.
And that is because the following two worlds are apparently equivalent: in one, the risky
firm sells ‘de jure safe’ bonds, defaults, and goes bankrupt; in the other, the risky firm
sells ‘de jure risky’ bonds, does not default, and stays in business. Surely the first world
seems closer to reality. And so, before ending this discussion for good, we would like
to suggest a new practice in economic models with bankruptcy/default: have assets be
labeled after the issuer (and not pool them together if their de-facto return-vectors are
different). In the real world firms typically issue only ‘de jure’ safe debt (with different
priorities), and the market takes care of categorizing it in ‘de facto’ terms (say, as risky or
safe debt). This should replace the traditional approach with purely “anonymous” assets
if the profession aims to take default/bankruptcy into account. Only then, and in rational
expectations equilibrium, should agents decide what is ‘safe’ and what is ‘risky’ and what
is ‘junk’ and so on, and put assets issued by different entities in the same bag.
6 But How Should Central Banks Take On Credit-
Risk?
The theoretical results from the economy with bankruptcy show that, indeed, “traditional
monetary policy” has undesirable consequences, and that having the central bank take on
credit risk could alleviate the economy from distortions. Furthermore, empirical studies
show that open-market-operations with risky assets do have an effect on credit-spreads
(consistent with the present model).23 But how should central banks take on credit risk?
The immediate answer would be “simply by purchasing risky assets,” just like the
FED has done by purchasing mortgage-backed-securities (MBS) and by selling insurance
to distressed institutions, and like both the FED and the ECB have done by giving loans
to distressed institutions, and so on.24 But this route is not a long term solution: choosing
one particular set of risky assets / risky lessees is not recommended because of market
power / distorted expectations / distorted spot markets, and so on. On the other hand,
using all the assets, though optimal, is computationally unrealistic / subject to human
error; and as a consequence the central bank could again, though presumably to a lesser
23See, for example, Rai(2013).
24For the FED, see Federal Reserve of New York (2013), Cecchetti (2009), and Kotlikoff and Mehrling
(2008). For the ECB, see Trichet (2009) and Reuters (2014).
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extent, distort the economy. Is there an ‘easy way’ to guarantee the absence of distortions
in a way that is not as prone to human error? Possibly. We discuss some options that
apply even under a variable probability of risky-industry failure.
6.1 Proportional Monetary Transfers: Theoretically Common,
Impossible in Practice
Practically all the monetary models with variable money-supply employ this device. It
can be summarized as follows: Let i denote the index of agents in the economy. Then, if
i’s cash balances at the end of the day are mi, his balances at the beginning of the next day
will be m′i = mi ·(1+θm), where θm is the same for all agents (though it may be stochastic
and/or vary over time). As a result of this mechanism, the relative distribution25 of cash
in the economy remains intact with respect to the monetary policy itself. This is an
ideal mechanism, but it is also an impossible one: the central banker would have to be
omnipresent in order to pay interest on everyone’s cash balances at exactly the same time.
To illustrate this mechanism with this paper’s model, one would have cash transfers
be state-dependent and take place right after the state of the world is revealed. As a
result, the household’s second constraint (equation (3)) would change to
m+ P(S)c+ Is(S)bHs ′ + Iu(S)bHu ′ ≤ m+ w +W(S) +D(S) (39)
with
m′ = m(1 + θm(S ′)) (40)
And the value function would be
V H(m,w, S) = max
c,m,bHs
′,bHu
′
{
u(c) + β E
[
V H(m′, w′, S ′)
]}
(41)
Meanwhile, the Central Bank would have bCBs
′
(S) = 0 for all S, and instead use θm as
its instrument:
V CB(S) = max
θm
{I(P(θm, S) = (1 + piT)P} (42)
where
P(θm, S) = M(1 + θm)−Υ(B
SF
u +B
RF
u )− (BSFs +BRFs )−W(S)
Y SF + ΥY RF
(43)
where M is one of the economy’s state variables included in vector S and it’s
M ′ =
∫
m (44)
25That is, the distribution of ‘the percentage of the total’.
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The household’s bankruptcy constraint (equation (34)) cannot be binding in this case,
because the household will lend positive amounts to both the safe and the risky firm.
That is, households do not borrow ‘safe’ to lend ‘risky’. Distortions would be absent.
6.2 Monetized Subsidies for Consumption: Theoretically Obvi-
ous, Long Shot in Practice
Since the central bank’s aim is to control the price-increase in the consumption-good, one
(awful) way to do this would be to have the central bank purchase/sale the consumption
good at the desired price (just like when fixing an exchange rate). But in a world with so
many different consumption goods this task would be excessively expensive and flawed.
There is, however, the possibility of providing a proportional subsidy (a percentage of
the price) for all consumption goods. In fact, the ‘infrastructure’ for doing so is already
available, namely that of Tax Authorities. Furthermore, providing this subsidy may
encourage the report of informal transactions and thus help reduce the level of informality
in some countries. This could actually be the best mechanism for implementing monetary
policy. But right now, it is not.
It has taken a lot of time and trouble to separate monetary from fiscal policy, to
have governments become more responsible, and to have people understand (or at least
accept) the fact that a low inflation rate is the best for society as a whole. Mixing fiscal
and monetary policies again could confuse things and destroy these achievements.
To illustrate this mechanism with this paper’s model, one would have consumers re-
ceive a proportional subsidy θc for their consumption good purchases. That is, households
would pay (1− θc)P (S) monetary units for each consumption unit they buy. The size of
this subsidy would be state-dependent.
The household’s constraints (equations (2) and (3)) would become
(1− θc(S))P(S)c+ Is(S)bHs ′ + Iu(S)bHu ′ ≤ m+ w (45)
m′ + (1− θc(S))P(S)c+ Is(S)bHs ′ + Iu(S)bHu ′ ≤ m+ w +W(S) +D(S) (46)
Meanwhile, the Central Bank would have bCBs
′
(S) = 0 for all S, and instead use θc as
its instrument:
V CB(S) = max
θc
{I(P(θc, S) = (1 + piT)P} (47)
where
P(θc, S) = M −Υ(B
SF
u +B
RF
u )− (BSFs +BRFs )−W(S)
(1− θc)(Y SF + ΥY RF) (48)
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As with proportional monetary transfers, the household’s bankruptcy constraint (equa-
tion (34)) cannot be binding in this case, because the household will lend positive amounts
to both the safe and the risky firm. That is, households do not borrow ‘safe’ to lend ‘risky’.
Distortions would be absent.
6.3 Monetized Subsidies for Bonds: Theoretically Sound, Achiev-
able in Practice
A far less disruptive way to implement the optimal monetary policy would be by subsi-
dizing bonds. In this paper’s economy, that amounts to paying a percentage of the bond’s
market price to the issuer at the time of sale.
This mechanism would avoid any zero-lower-bound concerns since the lender would
always receive a positive nominal interest rate (in equilibrium).26
Implementing this mechanism is no easy task, but many well-organized markets for
risky bonds are already in place and the Central Bank has a natural connection with
financial markets.
To illustrate this mechanism with this paper’s model, one would have households
receive a proportional subsidy θb for their bond purchases. That is, households would
pay (1− θb)Ii(S) for bond i (where i = s, u). In other words, households receive θbIi(S)
monetary units for every Ii(S) monetary units they lend to firms. This size of the subsidy
would be state-dependent.
The household’s constraints (equations (2) and (3)) would become
P(S)c+ (1− θb)Is(S)bHs ′ + (1− θb)Iu(S)bHu ′ ≤ m+ w (49)
m′ + P(S)c+ (1− θb)Is(S)bHs ′ + (1− θb)Iu(S)bHu ′ ≤ m+ w +W(S) +D(S) (50)
Meanwhile, the Central Bank would have bCBs
′
(S) = 0 for all S, and instead use θb as
its instrument:
V CB(S) = max
θb
{I(P(θb, S) = (1 + piT)P} (51)
where
P(θb, S) = M −Υ(B
SF
u +B
RF
u )− (BSFs +BRFs )− (1− θb)W(S)
Y SF + ΥY RF
(52)
As with proportional monetary transfers, the household’s bankruptcy constraint (equa-
tion (34)) cannot be binding in this case, because the household will lend positive amounts
26This is, of course, in an economy were nominal money balances never shrink over time, which happens
to be the case for every single economy in the world throughout history.
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to both the safe and the risky firm. Again, households will not borrow ‘safe’ to lend ‘risky’.
Distortions would be absent.
7 Implications for the Zero Lower Bound and the
Credit-Spread
The Zero Lower Bound problem vanishes with this paper’s proposal of Monetary
Policy implementation: by giving a proportional monetary subsidy to bonds (primary
market), the interest that lenders receive is always enough to guarantee their supply
of loanable funds/money, and avoid the hoarding of it. The subsidy would allow for
borrowers to pay negative nominal interest rates and lenders to receive positive nominal
interest rates, if necessary.
For the Credit Spread, one is able to obtain an interesting implication under the
strong assumption that Υ is an i.i.d. random variable, an assumption made throughout
the paper for the sake of tractability.
Recall that, given a constant industry-failure probability, the optimal policy is such
that the relative price of risky to risk-free bonds remains constant, just as in the under-
lying real-economy. This implies that the credit-spread increases with expansive optimal
monetary policy, and decreases with contractive optimal monetary policy.27
8 Conclusion
Today’s monetary systems are the result of historical accidents and disaster-responses.
Hopefully, the present work will provide a platform to show that it is possible to im-
plement monetary policies in ways that would speed-up recoveries and decrease the pro-
cyclicality of risk-taking behavior, all of this while reducing the misallocation of resources
/ eliminating distortions. The model of this paper is, naturally, a very crude representa-
tion of the world, particularly when it comes to the deterministic nature of Total Factor
Productivity, the independence of industry failures, and the relationship between industry
failures and Total Factor Productivity. Future improvements along these lines may render
a model that is not only theoretically insightful, but that is also helpful as a practical
tool.
27Where an expansive/contractive monetary policy is defined as an increase/decrease in the monetary
subsidy rate.
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Appendix
A The underlying real economy
In this section, we shall present and characterize the underlying real economy of the
paper. This will be a useful point of departure that will help us identify the optimum of
the paper’s monetary economy.
A.1 Preferences
The representative household of the economy has preferences given by:
Ut = U({cs}∞s=t) = Et
[ ∞∑
h=t
βt−hu(ch)
]
The utility function u(·) satisfies the conditions stated in the main body of this pa-
per. The available amount of the unique, perishable, consumption good—denoted Y—is
predetermined, and there is no technology to transfer it across time-periods. So the
household will consume all of it:
ct = Yt
The household is endowed every period with one unit of labor, which it supplies inelasti-
cally. The true choice of the household lies in which amounts of labor it will employ on
each of the available production technologies.
A.2 Production technologies
There are two available production technologies: a ‘safe’ technology and a ‘risky’ tech-
nology. Both production technologies take today’s labor as input in order to deliver a
possibly-random amount of output next period. The safe production technology delivers
an amount
Y SFt+1 = Atf(l
SF
t )
of output. A is the total factor productivity, which follows a deterministic, commonly-
known, path; l is labor; f(·) is a function satisfying the conditions stated in the main
body of this paper; and SF stands for ‘safe firm’.
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Let Υt be an i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable with probability of success υ strictly
between zero and one. The risky production technology delivers an amount
Υt+1Y
RF
t+1 = Υt+1Atγf(l
RF
t )
of output. RF stands for ‘risky firm’.
Naturally, next period’s amount of available consumption good will be the sum of the
two outputs. And hence, next period’s consumption is given by
ct+1 = Yt+1 ≡ Y SFt+1 + Υt+1Y RFt+1
Thus next period’s consumption is a—random—function of today’s labor allocation and
technology:
ct+1 = Atf(l
SF
t ) + Υt+1Atγf(l
RF
t )
A.3 Optimum
Notice that there is no terminal condition (hence no need for a transversality condition),
and that the allocation of labor between the safe and risky technologies is always interior
and unique by our assumptions. Furthermore, let us assume that the growth-factor of A
is bounded from above by β−1; this guarantees that the Total Utility is always finite and
hence that the mathematical problem is well-defined. Furthermore, because there is no
accumulation or any other persistent effect of choices, the optimal choice of (lSFt , l
RF
t ) can
be found without paying attention to other values of the sequence (i.e., values for t+ k).
The optimal allocation of labor will satisfy the first order conditions:
lSFt + l
RF
t = 1
β Et
[
uc
(
Atf(l
SF
t ) + Υt+1Atγf(l
RF
t )
)
Atfl(l
SF
t )
]
= λ
β Et
[
uc
(
Atf(l
SF
t ) + Υt+1Atγf(l
RF
t )
)
Υt+1Atγfl(l
RF
t )
]
= λ
We can easily calculate the expectations since there are only two possible states. The last
two conditions become:
υ
[
uc
(
Atf(l
SF
t ) + Atγf(l
RF
t )
)
Atfl(l
SF
t )
]
+ (1− υ) [uc (Atf(lSFt ))Atfl(lSFt )] = λ/β
υ
[
uc
(
Atf(l
SF
t ) + Atγf(l
RF
t )
)
Atγfl(l
RF
t )
]
= λ/β
Together they imply
1 +
(1− υ) uc
(
Atf(l
SF
t )
)
Atfl(l
SF
t )
υ uc(Atf(lSFt ) + Atγf(l
RF
t )) Atfl(l
SF
t )
=
uc
(
Atf(l
SF
t ) + Atγf(l
RF
t )
)
Atγfl(l
RF
t )
uc (Atf(lSFt ) + Atγf(l
RF
t ))Atfl(l
SF
t )
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or
1 +
(1− υ) uc
(
Atf(l
SF
t )
)
υ uc(Atf(lSFt ) + Atγf(l
RF
t ))
=
γfl(l
RF
t )
fl(lSFt )
which together with the restriction that lSFt + l
RF
t = 1 gives
1 +
(1− υ) uc
(
Atf(l
SF
t )
)
υ uc(Atf(lSFt ) + Atγf(1− lSFt ))
=
γfl(1− lSFt )
fl(lSFt )
At this point, we invoke CRRA. It can be shown (and we omit the proof) that if u(·) is
a utility function with CRRA, then uc(kx)/uc(ky) = uc(x)/uc(y) for all k, x, y > 0.
Therefore, the condition of the underlying real economy’s optimum can be further
simplified into
1 +
(1− υ) uc
(
f(lSFt )
)
υ uc(f(lSFt ) + γf(1− lSFt ))
=
γfl(1− lSFt )
fl(lSFt )
which proves that the optimal allocation of labor, if it exists, is constant over time (since
it is unique and independent of the state). It can be shown that, for a positive coefficient
of relative risk aversion (as was assumed), the left-hand-side strictly decreases in lSF from
infinity to some positive finite number, and the right-hand-side strictly increases in lSF
from zero to infinity. Thus showing existence.
Given the primitives u(·) and f(·), one is able to compute the optimal labor allocation
for every state. And, given the sequence {At}∞t=0, one can also compute the value function
arbitrarily well.
For our purposes, this last equation matters because it tells us when the corresponding
monetary equilibrium is optimal (i.e., has the same allocation of real resources that would
arise in a barter economy).
B Interest Rates and Credit-Risk
B.1 Interest rates and arbitrage
By construction, the price of a safe bond equals the inverse of its nominal return:
Is = 1
1 + is
, (53)
where is is the nominal interest rate of the safe bond.
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Notice that every state S has only two possible succeeding states. Since a contingent
bond pays one monetary unit in one of the possible succeeding states and zero in the
rest,28 we shall call that state the contingent bond’s pay-state.
For the state-contingent bond j ∈ {u, d}, the price equals the inverse of its pay-state
nominal return:
Ij = 1
1 + ij
, (54)
where ij is the pay-state nominal interest rate of bond j = u, d.
29
In general, we may call Ij the nominal discount factor (or price, for short) of bond
j = s, u, d.
Remark B.1. In a free market, the no-nominal-arbitrage condition Is = Iu + Id is
satisfied whenever future financial wealth has a positive shadow value at both possible
states of the world.
Intuitively, it must be that in equilibrium the nominal cost of a future dollar is the same
whether through the purchase of a safe bond or the purchase of both contingent bonds.
This no-nominal-arbitrage condition must be true whenever financial wealth has a positive
shadow value in every state for some agent in the economy.
Recall the identity that relates nominal interest rate i, real interest rate r, and infla-
tion pi:
1 + i ≡ (1 + r)(1 + pi) , (55)
where the three variables are, in general, random / state-contingent and we have lower-
cased them only for the purpose of exposition.
We introduce the pay-state real interest rate of contingent bond j, denoted rj, by
considering both the price-level and the nominal return at their pay-state as well:
(1 + rj) ≡ 1 + ij
1 + pij
= (1 + ij)
p
pj
for j = u, d; (56)
where the constant p is this period’s price-level, and the constant pj is next period’s
price-level at the pay-state.
28We treat a payment of zero as no payment. These type of bonds are often known as “Arrow securities”.
29Notice that, in every-day parlance, people do not specify ‘pay-state’ even though they implicitly
mean it. That is, when people say “that junk bond gives a 60% nominal interest rate” the statement
is typically contingent on the “junk bond” paying. Nevertheless, we shall keep the “pay-state” qualifier
since—formally—the nominal interest rate (without any further qualification) of a contingent bond j is
a random variable with both, −1 and ij , as possible outcomes.
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We define the real discount factor of bond j as the inverse of the pay-state real return:
Rj ≡ 1
1 + rj
= Ij pj
p
. (57)
One could easily consider a security which delivered the same real return in both states,
and had therefore a well-defined risk-free real discount factor Rs. In fact, any agent can
construct such a security in a synthetic fashion with the help of both contingent bonds.
Whether the security is synthetic or not, we have the following result.
Remark B.2. In a free market, the no-real-arbitrage condition Rs = Ru +Rd is satisfied
whenever future consumption has a positive value at both possible states of the world.
One therefore has that the equilibrium safe real interest rate can be computed from
this expression, since the no-real-arbitrage condition must be true as long as consumption
is valued in both states by some agent in the economy.
Notice that these two conditions (no-nominal-arbitrage and no-real-arbitrage) are in-
dependent if pu 6= pd. However, if the central bank is able to somehow guarantee pu = pd,
then both conditions imply each other. Without a central bank, pu = pd cannot be
guaranteed and inefficiencies may arise because of this.
B.2 Market-based measures of credit-risk
Let us now define three different measures of credit-risk for the model. This, in turn, will
help us characterize the behavior of credit-risk in our model.30
Definition. The ‘nominal risk-spread’, denoted by ξ, is the difference between the pay-
state nominal interest rate of the risky bond and the nominal interest rate of the safe
bond:
ξ ≡ iu − is .
The following measure will be frequently employed in the main text, for the sake of
exposition.
Definition. The ‘nominal risk-ratio’, denoted by IsIu , is the ratio between the safe bond’s
price and the risky bond’s price.
When talking about distortions, real relative prices–like the one in the following
definition–are crucial.
30For simplicity and consistency with the rest of the paper we use the bond j = u as ”the” risky bond.
But the terminology applies to any Arrow security.
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Definition. The ‘real risk-ratio’, denoted by ρ, is the ratio of the risky bond’s real return
to the safe bond’s real return:
ρ ≡ 1 + ru
1 + rs
By definition (eq. 57), the right-hand-side is equal to the relative price of real safe-
debt to real risky-debt. So the real risk-ratio can also be seen as the relative price of safe
to risky debt in the underlying real economy: ρ = RsRu . Naturally, we would expect this
relative-price to be weakly greater than one.
Let the constant pu be the price level for the succeeding state with Υ = 1, and the
constant pd be the price level for the succeeding state with Υ = 0. Then we get the
following useful expression.
Claim 3. Under the no-real-arbitrage and no-nominal-arbitrage conditions, the real risk-ratio
can be expressed in nominal terms as
ρ =
Ispd
Iupu −
pd
pu
+ 1 (58)
Proof. From the no-real-arbitrage condition we have
Rs = Ru +Rd (59)
⇒ 1
1 + rs
=
1
1 + ru
+
1
1 + rd
(60)
using the definition of real return we have
=
1 + piu
1 + iu
+
1 + pid
1 + id
(61)
= Iupu
p
+ Idpd
p
(62)
using the no-nominal-arbitrage condition we have
= Iupu
p
+ (Is − Iu)pd
p
(63)
= Iupu
p
+ Ispd
p
− Iupd
p
(64)
so we get the intermediate result
Rs = Iu
p
(pu − pd) + Ispd
p
. (65)
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Now, from the definition of real risk-ratio we have
ρ ≡ 1 + ru
1 + rs
= (1 + ru)Rs = 1 + iu
1 + piu
Rs = p
pu
Rs
Iu (66)
⇒ ρ = (pu − pd)
pu
+
Ispd
Iupu (67)
⇒ ρ = IspdIupu −
pd
pu
+ 1 . (68)
Corollary 1. If pu = pd (say, if there is a monetary policy that somehow ensures this)
then
ρ ≡ RsRu =
Is
Iu (69)
That is, the real risk-ratio equals the nominal risk-ratio. Moreover, in this case we also
have that the nominal risk-spread and the nominal risk-ratio are related according to the
equivalent equalities
ρ = ξIs + 1 ⇔ ξ = (ρ− 1)(1 + is) (70)
C Equilibrium for the model without bankruptcy
C.1 Full Derivation of Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
For the household, recall that
V H(m,w, S) = max
c,m′,bHs
′,bHu
′
{
u(c) + β E
[
V H(m′, w′, S ′)
]}
(71)
subject to
P(S)c+ Is(S)bHs ′ + Iu(S)bHu ′ ≤ m+ w (72)
m′ + P(S)c+ Is(S)bHs ′ + Iu(S)bHu ′ ≤ m+ w +W(S) +D(S) (73)
0 ≤ m′, c (74)
where
w′ ≡ bHs ′ + Υ′bHu ′ (75)
D(S) ≡ (P(S)Y SF +BSFs + ΥBSFu )+ (P(S)ΥY RF +BRFs + ΥBRFu ) (76)
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The corresponding Lagrangian is
L(c,m′, bHs ′, bHu ′, λ1, λ2) =
u(c) + β E
[
V H(m′, w′, S ′)
]
+ λ1[w +m− P(S)c− Is(S)bHs ′ − Iu(S)bHu ′]
+ λ2[w +m+W(S) +D(S)−m′ − P(S)c− Is(S)bHs ′ − Iu(S)bHu ′] .
(77)
The two last inequality restrictions are omitted: consumption is positive because u(·)
has an infinite derivative at zero; new money balances are positive by construction (firms
cannot keep money balances between periods).
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
c : uc − λ1P(S)− λ2P(S) = 0 (78)
m′ : β E[V Hm′ ]− λ2 = 0 (79)
bHs
′
: β E[V Hw′ ]− λ1Is(S)− λ2Is(S) = 0 (80)
bHu
′
: β E[V Hw′Υ
′]− λ1Iu(S)− λ2Iu(S) = 0 (81)
λ1 : λ1[w +m− P(S)c− Is(S)bHs ′ − Iu(S)bHu ′] ≥ 0 (82)
λ2 : λ2[w +m+W(S) +D(S)−m′ − P(S)c− Is(S)bHs ′ − Iu(S)bHu ′] ≥ 0 (83)
There is an abuse of notation, by taking ab ≥ 0 instead of a, b ≥ 0 and ab = 0.
From updating the envelope conditions we get
V Hm′ = λ
′
1 + λ
′
2 (84)
V Hw′ = λ
′
1 + λ
′
2 (85)
Rewriting the KT conditions we get
c :
uc
P(S) = λ1 + λ2 (86)
m′ : β E[λ′1 + λ
′
2] = λ2 (87)
bHs
′
:
β E[λ′1 + λ
′
2]
Is(S) = λ1 + λ2 (88)
bHu
′
:
β E[(λ′1 + λ
′
2)Υ
′]
Iu(S) = λ1 + λ2 (89)
λ1 : λ1[w +m− P(S)c− Is(S)bHs ′ − Iu(S)bHu ′] ≥ 0 (90)
λ2 : λ2[w +m+W(S) +D(S)−m′ − P(S)c− Is(S)bHs ′ − Iu(S)bHu ′] ≥ 0 (91)
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For the safe firm, recall that we have
V SF(S) = max
lSF,bSFs
′,bSFu
′
{
E
[
M(S ′, S)ΨSF(lSF, bSFs ′, bSFu ′, S ′, S)
]}
(92)
subject to
W(S)lSF + Is(S)bSFs ′ + Iu(S)bSFu ′ = 0 (93)
where
ΨSF(lSF, bSFs
′
, bSFu
′
, S ′, S) ≡ P(S ′)Af(lSF) + bSFs ′ + Υ′bSFu ′ (94)
M(S ′, S) ≡ Υ′Iu(S)
υ
+ (1−Υ′) (Is(S)− Iu(S))
1− υ (95)
Using the definitions of the stochastic discount factor and the state-dependent profits
we have that
E
[
M(S ′, S)ΨSF(lSF, bSFs ′, bSFu ′, S ′, S)
]
(96)
= Iu(S)[puAf(lSF) + bSFs ′ + bSFu ′] + (Is(S)− Iu(S)) [pdAf(lSF) + bSFs ′] (97)
= [Iu(S)pu + (Is(S)− Iu(S)) pd]Af(lSF) (98)
+ [Iu(S) + (Is(S)− Iu(S))]bSFs ′ + Iu(S)bSFu ′ (99)
= [Iu(S)pu + (Is(S)− Iu(S)) pd]Af(lSF) + Is(S)bSFs ′ + Iu(S)bSFu ′ (100)
= [Iu(S)pu + (Is(S)− Iu(S)) pd]Af(lSF)−W(S)lSF (101)
The last line substitutes the wage-bill in using the budget constraint. The first order
condition (with respect to lSF) is
[Iu(S)pu + (Is(S)− Iu(S)) pd]Afl(lSF∗) =W(S) (102)
which uniquely determines the choice of lSF. Any non-positive duple (bSFs
′
, bSFu
′
) satisfying
W(S)lSF∗ + Is(S)bSFs ′ + Iu(S)bSFu ′ = 0 maximizes the firm’ objective.31
For the risky firm, we have
V RF(S) = max
lRF,bRFs
′,bRFu
′
{
E
[
M(S ′, S)ΨRF(lRF, bRFs ′, bRFu ′, S ′, S)
]}
(103)
subject to
W(S)lRF + Is(S)bRFs ′ + Iu(S)bRFu ′ = 0 (104)
31Remember firms are non-financial (i.e., b′s must be non-positive).
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where
ΨRF(lRF, bRFs
′
, bRFu
′
, S ′, S) ≡ P(S ′)Υ′γAf(lRF) + bRFs ′ + Υ′bRFu ′ (105)
M(S ′, S) ≡ Υ′Iu(S)
υ
+ (1−Υ′) (Is(S)− Iu(S))
1− υ (106)
Using the definitions of the stochastic discount factor and the state-dependent profits
we have that
E
[
M(S ′, S)ΨSF(lSF, bSFs ′, bSFu ′, S ′, S)
]
(107)
= Iu(S)[puγAf(lRF) + bRFs ′ + bRFu ′] + (Is(S)− Iu(S)) bRFs ′ (108)
= Iu(S)[puγAf(lRF) + bRFu ′] + Is(S)bRFs ′ (109)
= Iu(S)puγAf(lRF) + Iu(S)bRFu ′ + Is(S)bRFs ′ (110)
= Iu(S)puγAf(lRF)−W(S)lRF (111)
(112)
Again, the last line substitutes the wage-bill in by using the budget constraint. The first
order condition (with respect to lRF) is
Iu(S)puγAfl(lRF∗) =W(S) (113)
So any non-positive duple (bRFs
′
, bRFu
′
) satisfying W(S)lRF∗ + Is(S)bRFs ′ + Iu(S)bRFu ′ = 0 is
optimal.
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C.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We restate the proposition for convenience:
Proposition 1 In the model without bankruptcy, every equilibrium with positive rates:
• is optimal (i.e., the allocation of real resources is the same as that of the underlying
real economy);
• has a perfectly enforced inflation target (i.e., P(S ′) = (1 + piT)P (S) for all S ′ given
S, for all S);
• has the same price-vector 〈P(S), Is(S), Iu(S),W(S)〉 (i.e., there is price-vector de-
terminacy);
• has a constant nominal risk-ratio IsIu .
The proof consists of the following steps:
1. Show that in an equilibrium with positive rates, the liquidity constraint of the
representative household is binding.
2. Show that, in equilibrium, if the liquidity constraint is binding, then the price-level
P(S) is uniquely determined and always satisfies the inflation target.
3. Show that, in equilibrium, if P(S) is uniquely determined and always satisfies the
inflation target, then (1) the allocation of labor is the same as that of the underlying
real economy and (2) the nominal risk-ratio IsIu is constant.
4. Show that, in equilibrium, if P(S) is uniquely determined and always satisfies the
inflation target and the allocation of labor is the same as that of the underlying real
economy, then Is(S), Iu(S),W(S) are uniquely determined as well.
Let us proceed.
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In an equilibrium with positive rates, the liquidity constraint of the represen-
tative household is binding. From the FOCs of the household we have that
m′ : β E
[
uc′
P(S ′)
]
= β E[λ′1 + λ
′
2] = λ2 (114)
bHs
′
:
β E[λ′1 + λ
′
2]
Is(S) = λ1 + λ2 (115)
Clearly, the shadow value of end-of-period money, λ2, is positive since the marginal utility
of consumption is always positive. Together the two conditions imply
λ2 = Is(S)(λ1 + λ2) (116)
or
λ1 = λ2
[
1
Is(S) − 1
]
> 0 (117)
since Is(S) < 1 by the assumption of positive rates.
In equilibrium, if the liquidity constraint is binding, then the price-level P(S)
is uniquely determined and always satisfies the inflation target. Since we just
proved that λ1 > 0 then it must be that the household’s liquidity constraint is satisfied
with equality:
P(S)c+ Is(S)bHs ′ + Iu(S)bHu ′ = m+ w (118)
aggregating the identical households over the unit continuum we get
P(S)
∫
c+ Is(S)
∫
bHs
′
+ Iu(S)
∫
bHu
′
=
∫
m+
∫
w (119)
using the clearing of financial markets and the firms’ budget restrictions one can substi-
tute the households’ bond-purchases for wage payments minus the central bank’s bond-
purchases, and writing M instead of
∫
m one gets
P(S)
∫
c+
(
W(S)− Is(S)bCBs ′
)
= M +
∫
w (120)
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decomposing the households’ financial wealth
∫
w into the holdings of the corresponding
maturing bonds, one gets
P(S)Y +
(
W(S)− Is(S)bCBs ′
)
= M −
∑
j
Bjs −Υ
∑
k
Bku (121)
where k = SF,RF and j = SF,RF,CB. Isolating nominal output on the left side we have
P(S)Y = M −
∑
j
Bjs −Υ
∑
k
Bku −W(S) + Is(S)bCBs ′ (122)
and finally, isolating the price level and disaggregating output by industry we have
P(S) = M −
∑
j B
j
s −Υ
∑
k B
k
u −W(S) + Is(S)bCBs ′
Y SF + ΥY RF
(123)
Notice that all but bCBs
′
are state variables or functions of the state variables. The central
bank has therefore complete control over the price level through the purchase/sale of safe
bonds; and he is indeed employing the right restriction to achieve its objective (namely
this last equation). The central bank will choose one and only one price-level, namely the
one that satisfies the inflation target (given the past price-level, which is a state variable
as well) and therefore maximizes its objective function. In conclusion, the price level P(S)
is uniquely determined and satisfies P(S ′) = (1 + piT)P(S) for all states S ′ successors of
S, for all states S.
In equilibrium, if P(S) is uniquely determined and always satisfies the inflation
target, then (1) the allocation of labor is the same as that of the underlying
real economy and (2) the nominal risk-ratio IsIu is constant. Consider the FOC
for the safe firm:
[Iu(S)pu + (Is(S)− Iu(S)) pd]Afl(lSF∗) =W(S) (124)
And consider the FOC of the risky firm:
Iu(S)puγAfl(lRF∗) =W(S) (125)
Since the inflation target is always satisfied, we can write p′ ≡ pu = pd. Both FOC’s can
be simplified to render
Is(S)p′Afl(lSF∗) =W(S) (126)
Iu(S)p′γAfl(lRF∗) =W(S) (127)
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Together implying
Is(S)p′Afl(lSF∗) = Iu(S)p′γAfl(lRF∗) (128)
or
ρ =
Is(S)
Iu(S) =
γfl(1− lSF∗)
fl(lSF∗)
(129)
On the other hand, from the household’s FOC’s we have
bHs
′
:
β E[λ′1 + λ
′
2]
Is(S) = λ1 + λ2 (130)
bHu
′
:
β E[(λ′1 + λ
′
2)Υ
′]
Iu(S) = λ1 + λ2 (131)
Together they imply
Is(S)
Iu(S) =
E[λ′1 + λ
′
2]
E[(λ′1 + λ
′
2)Υ
′]
(132)
=
E[uc(Y
′)/p′]
E[Υ′(uc(Y ′)/p′]
(133)
=
υ uc(Y
SF′+Y RF′)
p′ + (1− υ)uc(Y
SF′)
p′
υ uc(Y
SF′)
p′
(134)
Or
ρ =
Is(S)
Iu(S) = 1 +
(1− υ) uc
(
Af(lSF∗)
)
υ uc(Af(lSF∗) + Aγf(1− lSF∗)) (135)
Together equations (129) and (135) and the CRRA properties of the utility function imply
the condition:
γfl(1− lSF∗∗)
fl(lSF∗∗)
= 1 +
(1− υ) uc
(
f(lSF∗∗)
)
υ uc(f(lSF∗∗) + γf(1− lSF∗∗)) (136)
which is exactly the same as that of the underlying-real-economy (section A.3) and there-
fore determines the unique and optimal labor allocation, which is constant.
Since labor is constant, both equation (129) and equation (135) show that the nominal
risk-ratio is constant as well.
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In equilibrium, if P(S) is uniquely determined and always satisfies the inflation
target and the allocation of labor is the same as that of the underlying real
economy, then Is(S), Iu(S),W(S) are uniquely determined as well. Since labor
allocation lSF∗ is unique, so are output in the ‘lucky state’ u and output in the ‘unlucky
state’ d, in equilibrium:
Y ′u ≡ Y SF′ + Y RF′ = Af(lSF∗∗) + Aγf(1− lSF∗∗) (137)
Y ′d ≡ Y SF′ = Af(lSF∗∗) (138)
But then, from the household’s FOC’s, we have that
Is(S) = β E[λ
′
1 + λ
′
2]
λ1 + λ2
(139)
=
β
[
υ uc(Y
′
u )
p′ + (1− υ)
uc(Y ′d )
p′
]
uc(Y )
p
(140)
= (1 + piT)
β [υ uc(Y
′
u) + (1− υ)uc(Y ′d)]
uc(Y )
(141)
Thus Is is uniquely determined (since so is the right-hand-side). And similarly
Iu(S) = β E[(λ
′
1 + λ
′
2)Υ
′]
λ1 + λ2
(142)
=
β
[
υ uc(Y
′
u )
p′
]
uc(Y )
p
(143)
= (1 + piT) υ
βuc(Y
′
u)
uc(Y )
(144)
Thus Iu is uniquely determined (since so is the right-hand-side).
Finally, given the uniqueness of Iu, lSF∗∗, and p′, the risky firm’s FOC uniquely deter-
mines the equilibrium wage as well:
W(S) = Iu(S)p′γAfl(1− lSF∗∗) (145)
Q.E.D.
C.3 Proof of Claim 1
We state the definition of unconditional correlation now:
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Definition. The correlation between two random variables X and Z, given some distri-
bution F (X,Z), is denoted by corr(X,Z) and given by
corr(X,Z) = E
[(
X − E[X]
σX
)(
Z − E[Z]
σZ
)]
where σX is the standard deviation of X, and σZ is the standard deviation of Z.
Thus, establishing the distribution F (X,Z) is a basic requisite for calculating the
correlation.
We state the definition of conditional correlation now:
Definition. The correlation between two random variables X and Z conditional on a third
random variable W , given some distribution F (X,Z,W ), is denoted by corr(X,Z |W ) and
given by
corr(X,Z |W ) = E
[(
X − E[X]
σX
)(
Z − E[Z]
σZ
)∣∣∣∣W]
where σX is the standard deviation of X, and σZ is the standard deviation of Z.
Thus, establishing the distribution F (X,Z,W ) is a basic requisite for calculating the
correlation.
Notice that, for any constant c, we have that corr(X, cZ) = corr(X,Z) and corr(X, cZ |W ) =
corr(X,Z, |W ). This fact will be used extensively.
We state a more detailed definition of pro-cyclicality, and the claim to be proved, for
convenience:
Definition. A variable X(S) is said to be pro-cyclical if it is positively correlated with
the growth factor of output Y (S
′)
Y (S)
given a preceding state S 8, for all S 8:
corr
(
X(S),
Y (S ′)
Y (S)
∣∣∣∣S 8) > 0 ∀S 8
where F (S ′, S | S 8) = F (S ′ | S, S 8)F (S | S 8) = F (S ′ | S)F (S | S 8). The last equality
follows from the marcovian nature of the model.
For the sequential case, a stochastic process {Xt}∞t=0 is said to be pro-cyclical if corr
(
Xt,
Yt+1
Yt
)
> 0
for all t, given the stochastic process for the output’s growth factor {Yt+1
Yt
}∞t=0. A counter-
cyclical variable is defined by using the opposite strict-inequality signs.
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Claim 1 At the optimum, the monetary economy with an inflation-targeting central
bank has a pro-cyclical nominal risk-spread.
The proof consists of showing the perfect correlation of the nominal risk-spread to several
expressions and noting that the last of these expressions is positively correlated with
Y (S ′)/Y (S). Let us proceed.
Recall from subsection B.2 that the nominal credit-spread ξ is given by
ξ = (ρ− 1)(1 + is) (146)
where ρ is the real risk-ratio, which–under perfect enforcement of the inflation target–
equals the nominal risk-ratio IsIu . We just showed that the equilibria for the model without
bankruptcy have a constant nominal risk-ratio, so all the variation in the nominal risk-
spread comes from changes in 1 + is. Hence
corr(ξ, 1 + is) = corr(ξ, Is−1) = 1 (147)
Next, notice from the household’s KT conditions that
Is = β
1 + pi
E[uc(Y (S
′)) | S]
uc(Y (S))
(148)
=
β
1 + pi
E[uc(Y (S
′))/uc(Y (S)) | S] (149)
due to the properties of CRRA we can rewrite this as
=
β
1 + pi
E[uc(Y (S
′)/Y (S)) | S] (150)
hence
Is−1 = 1 + pi
β
(E[uc(Y (S
′)/Y (S)) | S])−1 (151)
It follows that
corr(ξ, (E[uc(Y (S
′)/Y (S)) | S])−1) = 1 (152)
And therefore the correlation that we are looking for is
corr((E[uc(Y (S
′)/Y (S)) | S])−1 , Y (S ′)/Y (S)) (153)
conditional on a given preceding state S 8.
We see that for any preceding state, there will be a positive correlation. The proof
for the sequential case follows from this last equation as well. Q.E.D.
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D Equilibrium in the presence of bankruptcy rights
D.1 Full Derivation of Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
For the household, recall that
V H(m,w, S) = max
c,m′,bHs
′,bHu
′
{
u(c) + β E
[
V H(m′, w′, S ′)
]}
(154)
subject to32
P(S)c+ Is(S)bHs ′ + Iu(S)bHu ′ ≤ m+ w (155)
m′ + P(S)c+ Is(S)bHs ′ + Iu(S)bHu ′ ≤ m+ w +W(S) +D(S) (156)
0 ≤ m′, c (157)
0 ≤ m′ + bHs ′ + bHu ′ − e(S) (158)
0 ≤ m′ + bHs ′ − e(S) (159)
where
w′ ≡ bHs ′ + Υ′bHu ′ (160)
D(S) ≡ (P(S)Y SF +BSFs + ΥBSFu )+ (P(S)ΥY RF +BRFs + ΥBRFu ) (161)
The corresponding Lagrangian is
L(c,m′, bHs ′, bHu ′, λ1, λ2, λ3) =
u(c) + β E
[
V H(m′, w′, S ′)
]
+ λ1[w +m− P(S)c− Is(S)bHs ′ − Iu(S)bHu ′]
+ λ2[w +m+W(S) +D(S)−m′ − P(S)c− Is(S)bHs ′ − Iu(S)bHu ′]
+ λ3[m
′ + bHs
′ − e(S)]
(162)
The non-negativity restrictions on m′ and c are omitted (for the same reasons as in
the model without bankruptcy): consumption is positive because u(·) has an infinite
derivative at zero; new money balances are positive by construction (firms cannot keep
money balances between periods). The absence of the next-to-last restriction is due to
subtler reasons:
32Notice that the last two inequalities together are equivalent to the stochastic inequality in the main
text.
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Firms cannot lend, bSFu
′
, bRFs
′ ≤ 0; and central banks do not deal with risky assets, by
assumption. Hence the market clearing condition bHu
′
+ bSFu
′
+ bRFs
′
= 0 implies that in
equilibrium bHu
′
= −(bSFu ′ + bRFs ′) ≥ 0. So we can safely omit the inequality restriction
where bHu
′
is added on one side of another existing restriction.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
c : uc − λ1P(S)− λ2P(S) = 0 (163)
m′ : β E[V Hm′ ]− λ2 + λ3 = 0 (164)
bHs
′
: β E[V Hw′ ]− λ1Is(S)− λ2Is(S) + λ3 = 0 (165)
bHu
′
: β E[V Hw′Υ
′]− λ1Iu(S)− λ2Iu(S) = 0 (166)
λ1 : λ1[w +m− P(S)c− Is(S)bHs ′ − Iu(S)bHu ′] ≥ 0 (167)
λ2 : λ2[w +m+W(S) +D(S)−m′ − P(S)c− Is(S)bHs ′ − Iu(S)bHu ′] ≥ 0 (168)
λ3 : λ3[m
′ + bHs
′ − e(S)] ≥ 0 (169)
There is an abuse of notation, by stating ab ≥ 0 instead of a, b ≥ 0 and ab = 0.
From updating the envelope conditions we get
V Hm′ = λ
′
1 + λ
′
2 (170)
V Hw′ = λ
′
1 + λ
′
2 (171)
Rewriting the KT conditions we get
c :
uc
P(S) = λ1 + λ2 (172)
m′ : β E[λ′1 + λ
′
2] = λ2 − λ3 (173)
bHs
′
:
β E[λ′1 + λ
′
2] + λ3
Is(S) = λ1 + λ2 (174)
bHu
′
:
β E[(λ′1 + λ
′
2)Υ
′]
Iu(S) = λ1 + λ2 (175)
λ1 : λ1[w +m− P(S)c− Is(S)bHs ′ − Iu(S)bHu ′] ≥ 0 (176)
λ2 : λ2[w +m+W(S) +D(S)−m′ − P(S)c− Is(S)bHs ′ − Iu(S)bHu ′] ≥ 0 (177)
λ3 : λ3[m
′ + bHs
′ − e(S)] ≥ 0 (178)
It will prove timely to state the following result:
Claim 4. In the presence of bankruptcy rights, every equilibrium has Is(S) > Iu(S) ∀S.
46
Proof. We prove this using two exhaustive and mutually-exclusive cases.
Case 1: λ3 = 0 In this case, the fact alone that the time-invariant probability υ is
strictly between zero and one, together with equations (267) and (268), give the result.
Case 2: λ3 > 0 In this case, the difference between Is(S) and Iu(S) is only strengthen
by the fact that λ3 > 0 and, in order to satisfy equations (267) and (268), Is(S) will have
to be even greater than for λ3 = 0.
For the safe firm, recall that we have
V SF(S) = max
lSF,bSFs
′,bSFu
′
{
E
[
M(S ′, S)ΨSF(lSF, bSFs ′, bSFu ′, S ′, S)
]}
(179)
subject to
W(S)lSF + Is(S)bSFs ′ + Iu(S)bSFu ′ = 0 (180)
and now also subject to33
0 ≤ puAf(lSF) + bSFs ′ + bSFu ′ (181)
0 ≤ pdAf(lSF) + bSFs ′ (182)
bSFs
′ ≤ 0 (183)
bSFu
′ ≤ 0 (184)
where
ΨSF(lSF, bSFs
′
, bSFu
′
, S ′, S) ≡ P(S ′)Af(lSF) + bSFs ′ + Υ′bSFu ′ (185)
M(S ′, S) ≡ Υ′Iu(S)
υ
+ (1−Υ′) (Is(S)− Iu(S))
1− υ (186)
Using the definitions of the stochastic discount factor and the state-dependent profits
we have that
E
[
M(S ′, S)ΨSF(lSF, bSFs ′, bSFu ′, S ′, S)
]
(187)
= Iu(S)[puAf(lSF) + bSFs ′ + bSFu ′] + (Is(S)− Iu(S)) [pdAf(lSF) + bSFs ′] (188)
= [Iu(S)pu + (Is(S)− Iu(S)) pd]Af(lSF) (189)
+ [Iu(S) + (Is(S)− Iu(S))]bSFs ′ + Iu(S)bSFu ′ (190)
= [Iu(S)pu + (Is(S)− Iu(S)) pd]Af(lSF) + Is(S)bSFs ′ + Iu(S)bSFu ′ (191)
33Notice that the two first inequalities together are equivalent to the stochastic inequality in the main
text; and this time we are writing down the non-positivity constraints for safe and risky debt because
they might be actually needed.
47
This time we will have to write down a (long) Lagrangian:
L(lSF, bSFs ′, bSFu ′, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) =
Is(S)p′Af(lSF) + Is(S)bSFs ′ + Iu(S)bSFu ′
+ λ1[−W(S)lSF − Is(S)bSFs ′ − Iu(S)bSFu ′]
+ λ2[p
′Af(lSF) + bSFs
′
+ bSFu
′
]
+ λ3[−bSFs ′]
+ λ4[−bSFu ′]
(192)
Notice that the second inequality restriction was omitted. This is because it can be–
and will be–shown that (regardless of the firms’ choice problems) in an equilibrium with
positive rates the inflation target is perfectly enforced. We therefore know pu = pd and
use p′ ≡ pu = pd instead. And, since bSFs ′ ≤ 0, the second inequality restriction is implied
by the first one and can be dropped.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
lSF : Is(S)p′Afl(lSF)− λ1W(S) + λ2p′Afl(lSF) = 0 (193)
bSFs
′
: Is(S)− λ1Is(S) + λ2 − λ3 = 0 (194)
bSFu
′
: Iu(S)− λ1Iu(S) + λ2 − λ4 = 0 (195)
λ1 : W(S)lSF + Is(S)bSFs ′ + Iu(S)bSFu ′ = 0 (196)
λ2 : λ2[p
′Af(lSF) + bSFs
′
+ bSFu
′
] ≥ 0 (197)
λ3 : λ3[−bSFs ′] ≥ 0 (198)
λ4 : λ4[−bSFu ′] ≥ 0 (199)
There is an abuse of notation, by stating ab ≥ 0 instead of a, b ≥ 0 and ab = 0.
Substituting out λ1, we get the following conditions
Is(S)p′Afl(lSF)−
(
1 +
λ2 − λ3
Is
)
W(S) + λ2p′Afl(lSF) = 0 (200)
λ2 − λ3
Is(S) =
λ2 − λ4
Iu(S) (201)
W(S)lSF + Is(S)bSFs ′ + Iu(S)bSFu ′ = 0 (202)
λ2[p
′Af(lSF) + bSFs
′
+ bSFu
′
] ≥ 0 (203)
λ3[−bSFs ′] ≥ 0 (204)
λ4[−bSFu ′] ≥ 0 (205)
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We will now show that λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0.
First, notice that multipliers λ3 and λ4 cannot be simultaneously positive because that
would entail zero production and would contradict the infinite marginal productivity of
labor at zero. Therefore, min{λ3, λ4} = 0. Next, if max{λ3, λ4} > min{λ3, λ4} = 0,
then it must be that λ2 > max{λ3, λ4} as well. Otherwise, one would get a contradiction
from the safe firm’s KT condition (201) and the positivity of bond prices. Next, if λ2 >
max{λ3, λ4} > min{λ3, λ4} = 0, then it must be that λ2 > λ4 > λ3 = 0. This follows
from the fact that Is(S) > Iu(S) (Claim 4) and from the safe firm’s condition (201). But
λ2 > λ4 > λ3 = 0 cannot be true because then (200) and (203) cannot both be satisfied.
Finally, λ2 > λ4 = λ3 = 0 cannot be true either because again (200) and (203) cannot
both be satisfied. It must therefore be true that λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0.
It follows from the previous paragraph that we can further simplify and reduce the
conditions to get
Is(S)p′Afl(lSF)−W(S) = 0 (206)
W(S)lSF + Is(S)bSFs ′ + Iu(S)bSFu ′ = 0 (207)
[p′Af(lSF) + bSFs
′
+ bSFu
′
] ≥ 0 (208)
−bSFs ′ ≥ 0 (209)
−bSFu ′ ≥ 0 (210)
Now, notice
p′Af(lSF) + bSFs
′
+ bSFu
′
(211)
> Isp′Af(lSF) + IsbSFs ′ + IsbSFu ′ (212)
≥ Isp′Af(lSF) + IsbSFs ′ + IubSFu ′ (213)
= Isp′Af(lSF)−WlSF (214)
but by the shape of f(·) and condition (187) we know that Isp′Af(lSF∗) − WlSF∗ > 0
so p′Af(lSF) + bSFs
′
+ bSFu
′
> 0 and we can ignore the restriction to get the smaller set of
conditions:
Is(S)p′Afl(lSF)−W(S) = 0 (215)
W(S)lSF + Is(S)bSFs ′ + Iu(S)bSFu ′ = 0 (216)
−bSFs ′ ≥ 0 (217)
−bSFu ′ ≥ 0 (218)
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Thus, we see that the safe firm is indifferent between issuing safe or risky debt. But we
assumed that, if indifferent, firms would finance themselves exclusively with safe debt.
Therefore the final conditions are
Is(S)p′Afl(lSF)−W(S) = 0 (219)
W(S)lSF + Is(S)bSFs ′ = 0 (220)
For the risky firm, we have
V RF(S) = max
lRF,bRFs
′,bRFu
′
{
E
[
M(S ′, S)ΨRF(lRF, bRFs ′, bRFu ′, S ′, S)
]}
(221)
subject to
W(S)lRF + Is(S)bRFs ′ + Iu(S)bRFu ′ = 0 (222)
and now also subject to34
0 ≤ puγAf(lRF) + bRFs ′ + bRFu ′ (223)
0 ≤ bRFs ′ (224)
bRFs
′ ≤ 0 (225)
bRFu
′ ≤ 0 (226)
where
ΨRF(lRF, bRFs
′
, bRFu
′
, S ′, S) ≡ P(S ′)Υ′γAf(lRF) + bRFs ′ + Υ′bRFu ′ (227)
M(S ′, S) ≡ Υ′Iu(S)
υ
+ (1−Υ′) (Is(S)− Iu(S))
1− υ (228)
Using the definitions of the stochastic discount factor and the state-dependent profits
we have that
E
[
M(S ′, S)ΨSF(lSF, bSFs ′, bSFu ′, S ′, S)
]
(229)
= Iu(S)[puγAf(lRF) + bRFs ′ + bRFu ′] + (Is(S)− Iu(S)) bRFs ′ (230)
= Iu(S)[puγAf(lRF) + bRFu ′] + Is(S)bRFs ′ (231)
= Iu(S)puγAf(lRF) + Iu(S)bRFu ′ + Is(S)bRFs ′ (232)
34Notice that the two first inequalities together are equivalent to the stochastic inequality in the main
text; and this time we are writing down the non-positivity constraints for safe and risky debt.
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This time we will have to write down a (long) Lagrangian:
L(lRF, bRFu ′, λ1, λ2, λ3) =
Iu(S)p′γAf(lRF) + Iu(S)bRFu ′
+ λ1[−W(S)lRF − Iu(S)bRFu ′]
+ λ2[p
′γAf(lRF) + bRFu
′
]
+ λ3[−bRFu ′]
(233)
Notice that it is way simpler than the original problem seemed. This is because from
the second and third inequality restrictions we get that bRFs
′
= 0. Thus bRFs
′
can be
dropped from the whole problem. We also set p′ ≡ pu for consistency with the safe firm’s
Lagrangian.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
lRF : Iu(S)p′γAfl(lRF)− λ1W(S) + λ2p′γAfl(lRF) = 0 (234)
bRFu
′
: Iu(S)− λ1Iu(S) + λ2 − λ3 = 0 (235)
λ1 : W(S)lRF + Iu(S)bRFu ′ = 0 (236)
λ2 : λ2[p
′γAf(lRF) + bRFu
′
] ≥ 0 (237)
λ3 : λ3[−bRFu ′] ≥ 0 (238)
There is an abuse of notation, by stating ab ≥ 0 instead of a, b ≥ 0 and ab = 0.
Next, substituting out λ1, we get the following conditions
Iu(S)p′γAfl(lRF)−
(
1 +
λ2 − λ3
Iu(S)
)
W(S) + λ2p′γAfl(lRF) = 0 (239)
W(S)lRF + Iu(S)bRFu ′ = 0 (240)
λ2[p
′γAf(lRF) + bRFu
′
] ≥ 0 (241)
λ3[−bRFu ′] ≥ 0 (242)
It can be shown that the two last constraints are always satisfied with strict inequal-
ity.35 The choice problem reduces to:
Iu(S)p′γAfl(lRF)−W(S) = 0 (243)
W(S)lRF + Iu(S)bRFu ′ = 0 (244)
35Because of the production function’s shape, maximizing Iu(S)puγAf(lRF)−W(S)lRF always leads to
a strictly negative bRFu
′
and strictly positive profits (no bankruptcy).
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D.2 Proof of the Lemma
We restate the Lemma for convenience:
Lemma In the presence of bankruptcy rights, equilibria with positive rates
1. are–in general–suboptimal, and
2. have a perfectly enforced inflation target (i.e., P(S ′) = (1+piT)P (S) for all S ′ given
S, for all S).
The proof consists of the following steps:
1. Show that in an equilibrium with positive rates, the liquidity constraint of the
representative household is binding.
2. Show that, in equilibrium, if the liquidity constraint is binding, then the price-level
P(S) is uniquely determined and always satisfies the inflation target.
3. Show that, in equilibrium, if P(S) is uniquely determined and always satisfies the
inflation target, then the allocation of labor is–in general–not the same as that of
the underlying real economy.
Let us proceed.
In an equilibrium with positive rates, the liquidity constraint of the represen-
tative household is binding. From the FOCs of the household we have that
m′ : β E
[
uc′
P(S ′)
]
= β E[λ′1 + λ
′
2] = λ2 − λ3 (245)
bHs
′
: β E[λ′1 + λ
′
2] = (λ1 + λ2)Is(S)− λ3 (246)
Clearly, λ2 − λ3 is positive since the marginal utility of consumption is always positive.
Together the two conditions imply
λ2 = Is(S)(λ1 + λ2) (247)
From the KT condition on consumption (and the fact that marginal utility of consumption
is always positive) we have that
uc
P (S)
= λ1 + λ2 > 0 (248)
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and substituting λ1 out using our previous result (equation 247) we have
= λ2
[
1
Is(S) − 1
]
+ λ2 > 0 (249)
=
λ2
Is(S) > 0 (250)
Therefore λ2 > 0, and λ1 = λ2
[
1
Is(S) − 1
]
> 0 since 0 < Is(S) < 1 by the assumption of
positive rates and the fact that prices are positive.
In equilibrium, if the liquidity constraint is binding, then the price-level P(S)
is uniquely determined and always satisfies the inflation target. Since we just
proved that λ1 > 0 then it must be that the household’s liquidity constraint is satisfied
with equality:
P(S)c+ Is(S)bHs ′ + Iu(S)bHu ′ = m+ w (251)
aggregating the identical households over the unit continuum we get
P(S)
∫
c+ Is(S)
∫
bHs
′
+ Iu(S)
∫
bHu
′
=
∫
m+
∫
w (252)
using the clearing of financial markets and the firms’ budget restrictions one can substi-
tute the households’ bond-purchases for wage payments minus the central bank’s bond-
purchases, and writing M instead of
∫
m one gets
P(S)
∫
c+
(
W(S)− Is(S)bCBs ′
)
= M +
∫
w (253)
decomposing the households’ financial wealth
∫
w into the holdings of the corresponding
maturing bonds, one gets
P(S)Y +
(
W(S)− Is(S)bCBs ′
)
= M −
∑
j
Bjs −Υ
∑
k
Bku (254)
where k = SF,RF and j = SF,RF,CB. Isolating nominal output on the left side we have
P(S)Y = M −
∑
j
Bjs −Υ
∑
k
Bku −W(S) + Is(S)bCBs ′ (255)
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and finally, isolating the price level and disaggregating output by industry we have
P(S) = M −
∑
j B
j
s −Υ
∑
k B
k
u −W(S) + Is(S)bCBs ′
Y SF + ΥY RF
(256)
Notice that all but bCBs
′
are state variables or functions of the state variables. The central
bank has therefore complete control over the price level through the purchase/sale of safe
bonds; and he is indeed employing the right restriction to achieve its objective (namely
this last equation). The central bank will choose one and only one price-level, namely the
one that satisfies the inflation target (given the past price-level, which is a state variable
as well) and therefore maximizes its objective function. In conclusion, the price level P(S)
is uniquely determined and satisfies P(S ′) = (1 + piT)P(S) for all states S ′ successors of
S, for all states S.
In equilibrium, if P(S) is uniquely determined and always satisfies the inflation
target, then the allocation of labor is–in general–not the same as that of the
underlying real economy. In a similar fashion as the proof of proposition 1, we obtain
the implied real risk-ratio for the representative household, then for the firms, and finally
we equate them. At that point, we notice that the resulting condition for labor allocation
is–in general–not the same as that in the model without bankruptcy.
Let us proceed.
From the household’s KT conditions (i.e. equations (172) through (178)) we have:
ρ =
Is(S)
Iu(S) =
β E [uc(Y
′)/p′] + λ3
β E [Υ′uc(Y ′)/p′]
(257)
=
E [uc(Y
′)] + λ3p′/β
E [Υ′uc(Y ′)]
(258)
=
υ uc
(
Af(lSF∗) + Aγf(1− lSF∗))+ (1− υ) uc(Af(lSF∗))+ λ3p′/β
υ uc(Af(lSF∗) + Aγf(1− lSF∗)) (259)
= 1 +
(1− υ)uc
(
Af(lSF∗)
)
+ λ3p
′/β
υ uc (Af(lSF∗) + Aγf(1− lSF∗)) (260)
On the other hand, from the safe firm condition (272) we have:
Is(S)p′Afl(lSF∗)−W(S) = 0 (261)
Together with the risky firm’s condition
Iu(S)p′γAfl(lRF∗)−W(S) = 0 (262)
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we have that
ρ =
Is(S)
Iu(S) =
γfl(1− lSF∗)
fl(lSF∗)
(263)
Equating the household’s ρ with the firms’ ρ and using the properties of CRRA we get
1 +
(1− υ) uc
(
f(lSF∗∗)
)
+KH
υ uc(f(lSF∗∗) + γf(1− lSF∗∗)) =
γfl(1− lSF∗∗)
fl(lSF∗∗)
(264)
where KH ≡ λ3uc(A)p′/β. The last equation differs from that of the underlying real
economy only due to the term KH ≥ 0.
It can be shown that, for some primitives of the model, there are states where the
household’s bankruptcy constraint binds (KH > 0).36 The resulting condition for labor
allocation in those states is different to that of the model without bankruptcy and leads
to a higher safe-firm labor lSF and a higher real risk-ratio ρ than at the unique optimum.
More labor at the safe firm and less at the risky firm implies, on average, a lower output
for the next period. This can be interpreted as a slower recovery. Notice that there are
purely walrasian mechanisms at work here; there are no rigidities or unexpected changes
in the price-level. Q.E.D.
D.3 Proof of the Theorem
We restate the Theorem for convenience:
Theorem In the presence of bankruptcy rights, equilibria with positive rates and signif-
icantly indebted households
1. have a counter-cyclical nominal risk-ratio IsIu , and
2. have a counter-cyclical amount of real resources allocated to the safe industry; indeed
implying that the economy takes more risk in expansions, and has slower recession
recoveries, on average.
The proof consists of showing that, in an equilibrium with significantly indebted house-
holds, if P(S) is uniquely determined and always satisfies the inflation target, then both
the nominal risk-ratio IsIu and the labor allocated to the safe industry are counter-cyclical.
Let us proceed.
36See the Theorem’s proof.
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D.3.1 The Equation System for the Theorem
We will now write down the equations needed for the Theorem: the household’s conditions,
the safe firm’s conditions, the risky firm’s conditions, and the market clearing conditions.
We do this taking into account that the first and second statements of the Lemma are
true (hence P(S) = (1 + piT)P), and simplifying wherever possible (we also drop the (S)
of state-dependent variables to shorten the expressions).
The household’s conditions are
uc
(1 + piT)P
= λ1 + λ2 (265)
β E[λ′1 + λ
′
2] = λ2 − λ3 (266)
β E[λ′1 + λ
′
2] + λ3
Is = λ1 + λ2 (267)
β E[(λ′1 + λ
′
2)Υ
′]
Iu = λ1 + λ2 (268)
w +m− (1 + piT)Pc− IsbHs ′ − IubHu ′ = 0 (269)
w +m+W +D −m′ − (1 + piT)Pc− IsbHs ′ − IubHu ′ = 0 (270)
m′ + bHs
′ − e = 0 (271)
The safe firm’s conditions are
Is(1 + piT)2PAfl(lSF)−W = 0 (272)
WlSF + IsbSFs ′ = 0 (273)
The risky firm’s conditions are
Iu(1 + piT)2PγAfl(lRF)−W = 0 (274)
WlRF + IubRFu ′ = 0 (275)
The market-clearing conditions are (at this point we can ignore integration signs)
c = Y SF + ΥY RF ≡ Y (276)
lSF + lRF = 1 (277)
bCBs
′
+ bHs
′
+ bSFs
′
= 0 (278)
bHu
′
+ bRFu
′
= 0. (279)
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These are 15 equations with the following 15 unknowns:
c, λ1, λ2, λ3, Is, Iu, bHs ′, bHu ′,W ,m′, lSF, bSFs ′, lRF, bRFu ′, bCBs ′.
At the risk of making an unnecessary statement, the following 6 extra equations (two
laws of motion, two updates of previous equations, and two identities) are also part of the
system
Y SF
′
= Af(lSF) (280)
Y RF
′
= Aγf(lRF) (281)
λ′1 + λ
′
2 =
uc′
(1 + piT)2P
(282)
c′ = Y SF
′
+ Υ′Y RF
′ ≡ Y ′ (283)
w = −[BSFs +BCBs + ΥBRFu ] (284)
D = (1 + piT)PY +BSFs + ΥB
RF
u (285)
The 6 extra ‘unknowns’ being λ′1 + λ
′
2, Y
SF′, Y RF′, c′, w,D.
A smaller system of 11 equations and 11 unknowns can be obtained through the
following straightforward and uncontroversial substitutions:
c is substituted out using equation (276)
lRF is substituted out using equation (277)
bSFs
′
is substituted out using equation (278)
bRFu
′
is substituted out using equation (279)
Y SF
′
is substituted out using equation (280)
Y RF
′
is substituted out using equation (281)
λ′1 + λ
′
2 is substituted out using equation (282)
c′ is substituted out using equations (283), (280), and (281)
w is substituted out using equation (284)
D is substituted out using equation (285)
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It seems timely to substitute out m for M and m′ for M ′. The resulting equation
system follows.
The household’s conditions
uc(Y )
(1 + piT)P
= λ1 + λ2 (286)
β E
[
uc(Af(l
SF) + Υ′Aγf(1− lSF))
(1 + piT)2P
]
= λ2 − λ3 (287)
β E
[
uc(Af(lSF)+Υ′Aγf(1−lSF))
(1+piT)2P
]
+ λ3
Is = λ1 + λ2 (288)
β E
[(
uc(Af(lSF)+Υ′Aγf(1−lSF))
(1+piT)2P
)
Υ′
]
Iu = λ1 + λ2 (289)
M − (1 + piT)PY − IsbHs ′ − IubHu ′ = BSFs +BCBs + ΥBRFu (290)
M +W −M ′ − IsbHs ′ − IubHu ′ = BCBs (291)
M ′ + bHs
′ − e = 0 (292)
The safe firm’s conditions
Is(1 + piT)2PAfl(lSF)−W = 0 (293)
WlSF = Is(bHs ′ + bCBs ′) (294)
And the risky firm’s conditions
Iu(1 + piT)2PγAfl(1− lSF)−W = 0 (295)
W(1− lSF) = IubHu ′ (296)
The 11 unknowns are:
λ1, λ2, λ3, l
SF, Is, Iu, bHs ′, bHu ′,W ,M ′, bCBs ′
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We focus on a smaller system of 8 equations and 8 unknowns by substituting
out λ1 + λ2 using equation (286), and by dropping equations (287) and (288). These two
last equations are a dead end because they don’t provide any worthwhile information:
even the fact that 0 ≤ λ3 ≤ λ2 seems useless. The smaller system follows:
Household
β E
[(
uc(Af(lSF)+Υ′Aγf(1−lSF))
(1+piT)2P
)
Υ′
]
Iu =
uc(Y )
(1 + piT)P
(297)
M − (1 + piT)PY − IsbHs ′ − IubHu ′ = BSFs +BCBs + ΥBRFu (298)
M +W −M ′ − IsbHs ′ − IubHu ′ = BCBs (299)
M ′ + bHs
′ − e = 0 (300)
Safe firm
Is(1 + piT)2PAfl(lSF)−W = 0 (301)
WlSF = Is(bHs ′ + bCBs ′) (302)
Risky firm
Iu(1 + piT)2PγAfl(1− lSF)−W = 0 (303)
W(1− lSF) = IubHu ′ (304)
The 8 unknowns are:
lSF, Is, Iu, bHs ′, bHu ′,W ,M ′, bCBs ′
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We can simplify an equation and transform two other equations into two more useful
equations to get:
Iu = βυ
(1 + piT)
uc
(
Af(lSF) + Aγf(1− lSF))
uc(Y )
(305)
M − (1 + piT)PY − IsbHs ′ − IubHu ′ = BSFs +BCBs + ΥBRFu (306)
M ′ = M −BCBs + IsbCBs ′ (307)
M ′ + bHs
′ − e = 0 (308)
Is(1 + piT)2PAfl(lSF) =W (309)
Iu(1 + piT)2PγAfl(1− lSF) =W (310)
W = Is(bHs ′ + bCBs ′) + IubHu ′ (311)
lSF
(1− lSF) =
Is
Iu
(bHs
′
+ bCBs
′
)
bHu
′ (312)
A smaller system of 5 equations is obtained by substituting out bHs
′
using equa-
tion (308), substituting out W using equation (309), and substituting out IubHu ′ using
equation (311). After some algebraic manipulations and a slight change in the equation
order we get:
Iu = βυ
(1 + piT)
uc
(
Af(lSF) + Aγf(1− lSF))
uc(Y )
(313)
Is = γfl(1− l
SF)
fl(lSF)
Iu (314)
M ′ = M −BCBs + IsbCBs ′ (315)
M −BCBs + IsbCBs ′ = Is(1 + piT)2PAfl(lSF) + (1 + piT)PY +BSFs + ΥBRFu (316)
bCBs
′
=
1
1− Is
[
(M −BCBs ) + lSF
W
Is − e
]
(317)
where WIs = (1 + pi
T)2PAfl(l
SF). The 5 unknowns are:
lSF, Is, Iu,M ′, bCBs ′
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Next, we will directly reduce this system into one equation with one unknown. First,
let us put Is in terms of lSF:
Is = γfl(1− l
SF)
fl(lSF)
βυ
(1 + piT)
uc
(
Af(lSF) + Aγf(1− lSF))
uc(Y )
(318)
This is obtained by substituting Iu in equation (314), using equation (313). Let Is(lSF, S)
be the function implicitly defined by this last equation. That is
Is(lSF, S) = γfl(1− l
SF)
fl(lSF)
βυ
(1 + piT)
uc
(
Af(lSF) + Aγf(1− lSF))
uc(Y )
(319)
Consider an appropriately modified version of equation (316):
M −BCBs + Is(lSF, S) bCBs ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
M ′
= Is(lSF, S) (1 + piT)2PAfl(lSF)︸ ︷︷ ︸
W
+ (1 + piT)PY +BSFs + ΥB
RF
u︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
(320)
Notice that it stands for
M ′ =W +D (321)
since
M ′ = M −BCBs + IsbCBs ′ (322)
W = Is(1 + piT)2PAfl(lSF) (323)
D = (1 + piT)PY +BSFs + ΥB
RF
u (324)
We already knew thatM ′ =W+D from the two household’s restrictions (269) and (270).
Now, however, we almost have this expression in terms of a single unknown: lSF. We are
just one step away. Let us consider equation (317). And notice
IsbCBs ′ =
Is
1− Is
[
(M −BCBs ) + lSF
W
Is − e
]
(325)
Now we can substitute IsbCBs ′ in equation (316) by using equation (325), and modify
it appropriately to finally get
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M ′(lSF,S)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
[1− Is(lSF, S) ]
[
M −BCBs + lSFIs(lSF, S) (1 + piT)2PAfl(lSF)− Is(lSF, S) e(S)
]
= Is(lSF, S) (1 + piT)2PAfl(lSF)︸ ︷︷ ︸
W(lSF,S)
+ (1 + piT)PY +BSFs + ΥB
RF
u︸ ︷︷ ︸
D(S)
(326)
One single equation with one single unknown: lSF.
We can manipulate equation (326) to get all the lSF-dependent terms on the left hand
side (LHS):
1
[1− Is(lSF, S) ]
[
M −BCBs +
(Is(lSF, S) + lSF − 1) Is(lSF, S) (1 + piT)2PAfl(lSF)− Is(lSF, S) e(S)]
= (1 + piT)PY +BSFs + ΥB
RF
u
(327)
D.3.2 Uniqueness and Existence (preliminaries)
Since both existence and uniqueness depend critically on equation (327), it will be useful
to establish the monotonicity of some of the terms in this equation with respect to lSF.
Is(lSF, S) is increasing in lSF. To see this, recall that (from our assumption that
the household’s liquidity constraint is binding) the equation system is only defined for
lSF ≥ lSFPareto. This is very useful because uc(Af(lSF) + Aγf(1 − lSF)) is strictly increasing
in lSF for all lSF greater or equal to lSFPareto.
37 The first term of equation (319) is always
increasing in lSF by the properties of f(·). Thus Is(lSF, S) is strictly increasing in lSF for
all lSF ∈ [lSFPareto, 1].
W(lSF, S) is increasing in lSF. To see this, recall that
W(lSF, S) = Is(lSF, S) (1 + piT)2PAfl(lSF) (328)
37The intuition is that uc(Af(l
SF) +Aγf(1− lSF)) is the marginal utility in the lucky state where the
risky technology does deliver. Thus, starting from the (ex-ante Pareto) lSF, an increase in the safe-firm’s
labor reduces the output.
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substituting in Is(lSF, S) we have
W(lSF, S) = γfl(1− l
SF)
fl(lSF)
βυ
(1 + piT)
uc
(
Af(lSF) + Aγf(1− lSF))
uc(Y )
(1 + piT)2PAfl(l
SF) (329)
or
W(lSF, S) = γfl(1− lSF)βυ
uc
(
Af(lSF) + Aγf(1− lSF))
uc(Y )
(1 + piT)PA (330)
Once again, we are faced with the fact that uc(Af(l
SF)+Aγf(1−lSF)) is strictly increasing
in lSF for all lSF greater or equal to lSFPareto. And, on top of that, the first term is strictly
increasing in lSF for all lSF. So W(lSF, S) is strictly increasing in lSF for all lSF ∈ [lSFPareto, 1].
The LHS of equation (327) is strictly increasing in lSF depending on e(S). Thus,
the role of e(S) in determining uniqueness is very important. Generally speaking, e(S) ≡
e(lSF(S), S) has to be consistent with a LHS that is strictly increasing in lSF in order to
get uniqueness. It turns out though, that for the most natural benchmark case (namely
e(S) equal to the nominal income) everything falls in place with ease. And, any value in
the neighborhood of the nominal income will lead to the same results as well.
D.3.3 Uniqueness and Existence when e(S) = εN (S) for some ε ∈ (0, 1]
We now use e(S) = εN (S) with ε ∈ (0, 1]. Plugging e(S) = εN (S) ≡ ε [W(S) +D(S)],
which also equals εM ′, into equation (327) we have
1
[1− Is(lSF, S) ]
[
M −BCBs +
(Is(lSF, S) + lSF − 1) Is(lSF, S) (1 + piT)2PAfl(lSF)
− Is(lSF, S) ε
[W(lSF, S) +D(S)] ] = (1 + piT)PY +BSFs + ΥBRFu (331)
By construction, the lSF that solves the system is the equilibrium one: lSF(S). So really
W(S) = W(lSF(S), S). Also, recall that W(lSF, S) = Is(lSF, S) (1 + piT)2PAfl(lSF) and
D(S) ≡ (1 + piT)PY +BSFs + ΥBRFu . Hence, after some manipulations, we get
M −BCBs +
(
[1− ε]Is(lSF, S) + lSF − 1
)W(lSF, S) = D(S) (332)
Uniqueness follows necessarily if the LHS is strictly increasing. Existence is obtained if
there is a value of lSF for which the equation is satisfied.38
38This sentence is somewhat sloppy. A rigorous analogue will appear shortly.
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Uniqueness given condition −fll(x)x
fl(x)
< 1−α2xγfl(x)−fl(1−x)γf(x)+f(1−x) is established through a
somewhat long argument.
First, have a look at equation (332) and notice that, for uniqueness, it is enough that(
[1− ε]Is(lSF, S) + lSF − 1
)W(lSF, S) be increasing in lSF (other terms are constant given
a fixed state S).
Next, let us differentiate this last expression with respect to lSF. If the resulting
expression is positive, uniqueness is guaranteed. Hence the following condition:(
[1− ε]∂Is(l
SF, S)
lSF
+ 1
)
W(lSF, S) + ([1− ε]Is(lSF, S) + lSF − 1)∂W(lSF, S)
∂lSF
> 0 (333)
This last condition can be rewritten as
W > [ε− 1] ∂Is
∂lSF
W + ([ε− 1]Is + [1− lSF])∂W
∂lSF
(334)
At this point, we recall that the four expressions ∂Is
lSF
, W , Is, and ∂W∂lSF , are all positive in
equilibrium, and that lSF ∈ (0, 1) in equilibrium as well. So, assuming ε ∈ (0, 1], it would
be sufficient for uniqueness to have the following simpler condition satisfied:
W > (1− lSF)∂W
∂lSF
(335)
Now, since
W = γβυPA(1 + pi
T)
uc(Y )
fl(1− lSF)uc
(
Af(lSF) + γAf(1− lSF)) (336)
and
uc(x) = α1x
−α2 , (337)
one has that
∂W
∂lSF
=
γβυPA1−α2(1 + piT)
Y −α2
·{
fll(1− lSF)(−1)α1
[
f(lSF) + γf(1− lSF)]−α2
+fl(1− lSF)α1(−α2)
[
f(lSF) + γf(1− lSF)]−α2−1 [fl(lSF) + γfl(1− lSF)(−1)]}
(338)
Substituting W and ∂W
∂lSF
back into the inequality, and manipulating somewhat, one gets
−fll(1− l
SF)(1− lSF)
fl(1− lSF) < 1− α2(1− l
SF) · γfl(1− l
SF)− fl(lSF)
γf(1− lSF) + f(lSF) (339)
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which is true by the assumptions made for the production function f(·).
We are favoring parsimony over generality by considering the case ε ≤ 1, and e(S) =
εN . It is likely that a less stringent condition suffices for an even wider set of the
parameter ε.
Existence requires the right-hand-side of equation (332) to be greater or equal to the
left-hand-side evaluated at lSFPareto. Notice that this is a necessary condition for the house-
hold’s bankruptcy constraint to be satisfied with equality for the given state, in equilib-
rium. It is by no means a necessary condition for an equilibrium with positive rates to
exist. If this condition were not satisfied for a given state S0, it would only mean that
households are not significantly indebted in the corresponding equilibrium.
Since, by assumption, the equilibria we focus on have significantly indebted households,
the existence condition is satisfied for every state. We can therefore proceed with our
analysis. But before we do so, there is a subtler issue we would like to point out.
The assumption that has been made throughout the paper, namely that equilibria have
positive rates, may constrain lSF from above since Is(lSF, S) is increasing in lSF and positive
rates imply Is(lSF, S) < 1. This is true for all cases: without bankruptcy restrictions or
with bankruptcy restrictions (with or without indebted households). Let this upper bound
for lSF be written as lSF(S).39 It may seem superfluous to bring this up now, but since
we just showed that the LHS of equation (332) evaluated at lSFPareto has to be smaller than
or equal to the RHS for existence, transparency requires us to remember that the LHS
evaluated at lSF(S) has to be weakly greater than the RHS for existence as well, which
we assume. Together, these two conditions are sufficient for existence.
D.3.4 D, Is, W, and M ′ are greater in the lucky state, in equilibrium
Having established that the equilibrium exists and is unique, we wish to distinguish the
“lucky state” from the “unlucky state”, qualitatively. Consider changing Υ from zero to
one, other state-variables equal (that is, fixing the subvector S−Υ).
First, by the properties of f(·) and the corresponding first order conditions, dividends
D(S) are greater in the lucky state. This is because the safe firm’s ex-post profits are
the same in both lucky and unlucky state; but the risky firm’s ex-post profits are only
positive in the lucky state. So dividends (which equal ex-post profits) are greater in the
lucky state.
Next, we use a two-stage thought experiment:
39That is, lSF(S) is implicitly defined by Is(lSF, S) = 1.
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Let Su denote the state S with Υ = 1 (i.e., the state is “up”); and similarly let
Sd denote the state S with Υ = 0 (i.e., the state is “down”). Assume both states are
otherwise equal. Let lSFd be the solution to equation (332) when S = Sd. And define
Is,d ≡ Is(lSFd , Sd). Now, consider the equation Is,d = Is(lSF, S), and define lSFu¯ implicitly
by Is,d = Is(lSFu¯ , Su). In other words, start from an equilibrium situation in the unlucky
state, change Υ from zero to one (change to the lucky twin-state), and set lSF to the value
such that the price of the safe asset Is stays as before; that value is denoted lSFu¯ .
A quick inspection of equation (319) reveals that lSFu¯ < l
SF
d . Furthermore, inspecting
equation (328) reveals that W(lSFu¯ , Su) > W(lSFd Sd) but, since our assumptions guarantee
xfl(x) is increasing in x,
40 we have that lSFu¯ W(lSFu¯ , Su) < lSFd W(lSFd , Sd).
Notice that equation (332) can be rewritten as
M −BCBs +
(
[1− ε]Is(lSF, S)− 1
)W(lSF, S) + lSFW(lSF, S) = D(S) (340)
Starting from the equilibrium situation under S = Sd we have
M −BCBs +
(
[1− ε]Is(lSFd , Sd)− 1
)W(lSFd , Sd) + lSFd W(lSFd , Sd) = D(Sd) (341)
Next, changing Υ from zero to one (Sd to Su) and keeping Is constant (setting lSF to lSFu¯ )
we have
M−BCBs +
(
[1− ε]Is(lSFu¯ , Su)− 1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
negative and stayed constant
· W(lSFu¯ , Su)︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive and increased
+ lSFu¯ W(lSFu¯ , Su)︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive and decreased
< D(Su)︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive and increased
(342)
It follows that the equilibrium value of lSF at state S = Su, denoted l
SF
u , must be strictly
greater than lSFu¯ to achieve equality (satisfy the equilibrium equation). As a result, we
now know that Is and W are greater in the lucky state. And, since M ′ = W + D, we
know that M ′ is greater in the lucky state as well.
D.3.5 lSF∗ is greater in the lucky state
Start by recalling the equations
W = M ′ −D (343)
W = lSFW + lRFW (344)
W = Is(bCBs ′ + bHs ′) + IubHu ′ (345)
W = IsbCBs ′ + Is(e−M ′) + IubHu ′ (346)
40Our assumptions guarantee that − fll(x)xfl(x) < 1. But then −fll(x)x < fl(x) or, equivalently, 0 <
fl(x) + fll(x)x; this last expression is the derivative of xfl(x) with respect to x; so xfl(x) is indeed
increasing in x.
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Remember e is the exempted amount for households in case of bankruptcy.
From the first equation of the previous group, we immediately know that
∆W = ∆M ′ −∆D (347)
where the operator ∆ satisfies ∆h = h |Υ=1 −h |Υ=0. That is, the operator ∆ stands for
‘the change in this expression with respect to a change in Υ from zero to one’. And we
use ∆ as an operator that goes before over addition, and goes after multiplication.
Now, since M ′ = (M −BCBs ) + IsbCBs ′, we also know that
∆M ′ = ∆IsbCBs ′ (348)
From equation (344), it follows that
∆W = ∆lSFW + ∆lRFW (349)
= IsbCBs ′ + Is(e−M ′) + ∆lRFW (350)
= ∆M ′ + ∆Is(e−M ′) + ∆lRFW (351)
Together with equation (347) we have
∆M ′ −∆D = ∆M ′ + ∆Is(e−M ′) + ∆lRFW (352)
or
−∆D = ∆Is(e−M ′) + ∆lRFW (353)
(354)
Hence
∆lRFW = ∆Is(e−M ′)−∆D (355)
= ∆Is(εN −M ′)−∆D (356)
= ∆Is(εM ′ −M ′)−∆D (357)
= ∆Is(ε− 1)M ′ −∆D (358)
= (ε− 1)∆IsM ′ −∆D (359)
Since ∆IsM ′,∆D > 0 and (ε − 1) ≤ 0 we have that ∆lRFW ≤ 0. And since we know
from earlier that ∆W > 0, it must be that ∆lRF < 0. Q.E.D.
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D.4 Proof of the Claim
We restate the Claim for convenience:
Claim (Theorem extension on counter-cyclical Credit-Spreads) For each set of primitives,
there is a real number α > 0 such that: if the Constant Relative Risk Aversion coefficient
α2 < α, then the equilibrium nominal risk-spread (a.k.a. credit-spread) is counter-cyclical
as well.
To see this, recall that–under perfect enforcement of inflation–the nominal credit-spread
ξ ≡ iu − is is given by
ξ = (ρ− 1)(1 + is) (360)
= (1− ρ−1)ρI−1s (361)
= (1− ρ−1)ρ(ρIu)−1 (362)
= (1− ρ−1)I−1u (363)
Substituting in the equilibrium terms for ρ and Iu we have
ξ =
(
1− γ−1 fl(l
SF)
fl(1− lSF)
)
(1 + piT)
βυ
uc(Y )
uc (Af(lSF) + Aγf(1− lSF)) (364)
Recalling that constants ( like (1+pi
T)
βυ
) are irrelevant for correlations, we can consider the
following modified credit-spread:
ξ∗ =
(
1− γ−1 fl(l
SF)
fl(1− lSF)
)
uc(Y )
uc (Af(lSF) + Aγf(1− lSF)) (365)
Finally, writing down the marginal utilities in explicit form, we have
ξ∗ =
(
1− γ−1 fl(l
SF)
fl(1− lSF)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
counter-cyclical
(
Af(lSF) + Aγf(1− lSF)
Y
)α2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pro-cyclical
(366)
The variance of the pro-cyclical factor can be arbitrarily dampened by choosing a smaller
α2. The equilibrium l
SF becomes smaller, and hence the radicand of the pro-cyclical factor
has a greater variance; however this growth in variance is bounded (it cannot exceed the
variance that would follow from a risk-neutral choice). On the other hand, the dampening
that occurs by a bigger root degree (the smaller exponent α2) is unbounded.
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Finally, the variance of the pro-cyclical factor does go to zero (and the variance of the
counter-cyclical factor does not go to zero) because ∆lSF does not go to zero and does
not grow without bounds. The latter must be true since lSF lies by construction between
zero and one, so the variance of the radicand is bounded; the former though, is somewhat
more subtle: If the equilibrium lSF does shrink, then we know that the variance of output
increases (since then the risky component of output is greater), and so does the variance
of dividends too. It then follows, from equation (359), that the variance of lSF cannot go
to zero. Q.E.D.
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